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Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-
The Usury Headache
Marion Benfield*
The usury headache, Professor Benfield asserts, results from the fail-
ure of present State usury prohibitions to operate effectively. A founda-
tion for fully understanding the usury problem is provided by the author's
discussion of the rationale for and historical development of usury regu-
lation, which is followed by a comprehensive examination of the current
statutory schemes. In his evaluation of the applicable statutes, the author
emphasizes that numerous exceptions, exemptions, and avoidance tech-
niques have the effect of nullifying many statutory provisions with the
result that over one-half of our total private debt is not subject to usury
regulation. To cure the headache, Professor Benfield urges that the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code be adopted by the States. It is argued that
Consumer Code provisions will result in realistic interest rate ceilings,
increased competition in the credit marketplace, and full disclosure to
the borrower of the applicable rates, thus serving to bring equity and or-
der to this confused area.
L INTRODUCTION
V EBSTER'S DICTIONARY defines migraine as a "kind of
nervous headache, usually periodical, and confined to one
side of the head." That description fits the usury problem in the
United States in this century. It has arisen in acute form periodi-
cally, at times when the gen-
eral money market interest
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level approaches the interest
rate ceiling of many States.'
Further, like the migraine
headache, the usury problem
(because of the exemptions
from the general usury statutes
in various States) is confined to
a part of the total lending mar-
ket. Similarly, the usury head-
ache may be characterized as a nervous or neurotic one, based upon
an attachment to usury laws which does not seem to be rational and
which substantially ignores the realities of money market and inter-
est rate behavior.
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In spite of the fact that this country has never seriously con-
sidered price fixing of goods and services except in times of national
emergency, all States except two impose maximum prices for the
use of money; however, because of various exclusions and special
higher rates for particular transactions, less than one-half of the
total amount of lending is subject to the general usury statutes.2
Further, the usury laws often do not have the supposed effect of
fixing a rate ceiling even as to loans nominally subject to them.
When the general money market level or the risk or cost involved
in the particular transaction makes the usury rate unrealistically low,
there are many devices, some clearly approved by the courts, some
clearly disapproved, and some untested but trusted, which are used
to produce a reasonable return.3
Even though general usury laws have substantially less impact
than might be supposed, in times of "tight money" they do operate
to create artificial barriers to the flow of money into States with low
statutory ceilings and to entice money out of these States into States
with higher rates. They also operate selectively to impose on cer-
tain borrowers, primarily the homebuilding industry, the burden
of cutting back production in the face of a tight money market.
Furthermore, even in times of "easy money," usury laws substitute
legislative judgment for private judgment as to how credit worthy
the borrower should be in order to secure a loan. For instance, in
a State which applies a 6 percent maximum rate to loans to non-
corporate businessmen, those whose situation calls for a higher rate
to compensate the lender for greater risk may be denied access to
the legal credit market.
The position here taken is that laws fixing ceilings on the price
which may be charged for the use of money are no more desirable
than any other form of price fixing, except in the case of consumer
and small business credit where it is desirable to protect the necessi-
tious or unsophisticated borrower against the overreaching credit
supplier. Ironically, all States except Arkansas have recognized that
the risks and costs of lending are such that the general usury rates
on Uniform State Laws, Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer
Credit, Small Loans and Usury.
It should also be noted that the draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code re-
ferred to throughout this article is a tentative draft. It has not yet been approved by
the Conference and is subject to change before final approval.
1 The general money market interest level approached the interest rate ceiling of
many States in the 1920's, the early 1950's, and several times in this decade.
2 See notes 165-90 infra & accompanying text.
3 See notes 191-237 infra & accompanying text.
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are too low for consumer loans and have passed special legislation
authorizing higher rates for consumer transactions.4
As long ago as 1786, Jeremy Bentham gave rather conclusive
economic arguments against general usury laws,' and in England,'
in many European countries, and in many other countries of the
world there have been no general usury laws for a hundred years.7
But in most of our States they linger on to present obstacles to the
freedom of businessmen to pay appropriate prices for appropriate
risks and to create artificial barriers to, and artificial channels for,
the flow of money from State to State. The foregoing words are,
it is realized, fighting words to many, particularly to those who
have only occasional contact with the money market and who
think primarily of the consumer borrower when they think of usury
laws. So that the position taken in this article will not be misun-
derstood, it should be emphasized again that the one area in which
control of rates by statute is clearly needed is that of small con-
sumer loans. However, the general usury laws do not operate in
this area except in one State and except as to home mortgage loans.
The position taken herein is that in the home mortgage loan area
usury statutes do more harm than good; low interest home mort-
gage loans, if they are to be encouraged, must be encouraged
through special governmental programs directed particularly to
them. The present general usury laws do not have the desired
effect.8
This article will discuss briefly the history, theory, and effect of
4 See notes 62-130 infra & accompanying text.
5 Bentham, Letters in Defense of Usury, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAm'S WoRKS 1-29
(1843).
6 The Usury Laws Repeal Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vicr., c. 90. The Moneylender's
Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51, § 1 as amended by the Moneylender's Act of 1927,
17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21, § 10 provides that, if a court finds that the interest charged is
excessive or the transaction is harsh and unconscionable, the court may reopen the trans-
action and reduce the interest to a level deemed by the court to be fair. A rate of more
than 48 percent per year is presumptively excessive.
7 Denmark, Spain, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Belgium abolished statutory
limits on interest ceilings in the mid-19th century. R. PALGRAVE, 2 PALGR1UW'S Dic-
IONARY op POLITICAL EcoNomyn 433-34 (H. Higgs ed. 1925), cited in Merriman &
Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 M. L.
REV. 1, 8 n.47 (1967). The current fartindale-Hubbell foreign law summaries indi-
cate that Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden pres-
ently prescribe no statutory maximum interest rate. See the "interest" entry in the
digests for these countries in 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL I.Aw DIRECTORY (100th ed.
1968). Generally, in these countries the courts would be able to set aside or reduce the
interest charged if the court found the rate unconscionable or unreasonably high. The
digest states the present French rule to be: "Usury is defined as interest exceeding [by]
25% ... [the] ordinary rate applied by banks for similar operations." Id. at 2949.
8 See notes 191-237 infra & accompanying text.
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usury statutes, the elements involved in fixing the price for the use
of money, the present general usury statutes in the United States and
the statutory and judicial exceptions to them. It will then consider
the present effectiveness and effect of usury statutes and will con-
dude with a discussion of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code pro-
visions dealing with the usury question, which propose a treatment
of interest rate limitations which the writer believes to be a sound
cure for the usury headache.9
A. History of Usury Laws and Interest
The lessons of history concerning legislative attempts to fix
interest rates have not yet been learned. As the following short
survey indicates, statutes prohibiting the taking of interest or regu-
lating interest rates never seem to have been effective when they ig-
nore the realities of money market behavior, but, in this country
at least, they are still being tried.
Credit is almost certainly as old as organized society," and,
unless human nature has changed more than seems likely, the first
interest was charged at about the time the first loan was made. The
charging of interest on loans in primitive societies has been noted
in many cases - a not infrequently reported rate of charge being
two-for-one on a loan to the next harvest (a rate of 100 percent and
up).11 Such rates seemed severe to those who paid them, and, as
might be expected, many early societies had legal provisions reg-
ulating interest rates. The Code of Hammurabi, for example,
fixed maximum rates on loans of grain at 33 1/3 percent and on
loans of silver at 20 percent.' However, even though under the
Hammurabic Code charging rates above the legal maximum re-
9 A number of articles have been written in recent years attacking usury laws. See,
e.g., Harrell, Mortgage Investments and the Usury Problem, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
343 (1961); Merriman & Hanks, supra note 7; Prather, Economics, Morality and the
Real-Estate Loan, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 475 (1967); Shanks, Practical Problems
in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327 (1967). See also the
excellent student note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Re-
form for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105 (1955). For comparative purposes, see the
following articles defending usury statutes: Collins & Ham, The Usury Laws of Arkansas:
A Study in Evasion, 8 ARK. L. REV. 399 (1954), and Comment, Usury - Effectiveness
of the General Usury Statutes in Missouri, 26 Mo. L. REv. 217 (1961). For a good
general discussion of usury laws and of the usual legal rules which have developed around
them, see Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 36
(1941).
10 S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 17-24 (1963).
11 Id. at 22-23.
12Id. at 30.
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suited in loss of the right to collect the principal, legal rates did not
limit actual rates, and there is evidence that the highest actual rates
on loans of silver were around 25 percent.13
The Romans under the Republic and the Empire enacted usury
statutes which fixed maximum interest at rates which varied from
time to time from a low of 4 1/6 percent to a high of 12 per-
cent,'4 and there were also some sporadic, unsuccessful attempts to
prohibit any taking of interest." There is substantial evidence that
actual interest rates were often above the legal maxima.'" With
the collapse of the Roman Empire, the church-oriented society of
the early Middle Ages took seriously the Biblical injunctions"
against lending at interest and church and state prohibitions against
usury became increasingly severe."8
However, at no time were the church and state prohibitions
completely successful in stamping out loans at interest, and with
the beginning of the trade revival in the 11th and 12th centuries
considerable thought and ingenuity went into the development of
plans and theories by which compensation could be paid for the
use of money without violating prohibitions against usury. One
of the avoidance devices was a doctrinal distinction between gain
(usury) from the loan of money and loss (interesse-interest) occa-
sioned by the fact that the lender was deprived of the use of the
money. Originally this concept was limited to initially interest-
free loans for which interest might be charged if the loan was not
repaid when due. However, once the principle was established it
was used as a revenue-producing device in a number of ways.
Loans were made payable at a date on which neither the lender
nor the borrower expected repayment to take place so that interest
13 Id Even though Aristotle considered charging interest for the use of money un-
natural because money did not beget money, the traders and moneylenders of Athens,
being more realistic about the returns to be gotten from borrowed money, borrowed
and lent at rates of from 6 percent to around 18 percent. ARIsTOTLE, PoLiTcs, book
1, ch. 10. See S. HOMER, supra note 10, at 43.
14 S. HOMER, supra note 10, at 52.
:15 J. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF UsURY 28 (1866).
10 Id. at 52-55. In 44 B.C. Senator Marcus Junius Brutus made a loan to a city in
Asia Minor at a rate of 48 percent per year. Cicero criticized Brutus for the transaction,
pointing out that the legal rate was 12 percent per annum. Id. at 47.
17 'Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother, usury of money; usury of vic-
tuals; usury of anything.... Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy
brother thou shalt not lend upon usury." Deuteronoxy23:19-20.
And from the New Testament, "lend freely, hoping nothing thereby." Luke 6:35.
The original meaning of usury was interest, and the Biblical prohibitions were against
any interest taking.
18 See S. HoMER, supra note 10, at 70.
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might be charged after the fictitious due date. Also, the concept
was extended to allow interest from the beginning in cases where
the lender had to sell property to get the money to lend or where
he clearly gave up income-producing opportunities by making the
loan.1" Another device which finally gained church approval was
a special "partnership contract" in which the special partner was
guaranteed a fixed return on his investment."0 Still another device
was the "annuity" or "census" which involved the sale of an obli-
gation to pay an annual return from productive property. This
arrangement, which varied in form from a modern annuity to a
modern redeemable bond, generally was not challenged as usurious
if the interest was set at a reasonable rate. 1 Also, since Jews were
not subject to church control, they often were permitted by church
and state authorities to lend at interest to gentiles.'
In the 13th and 14th centuries, commercial pressures became
so great that in many parts of Europe laws were adopted permitting
interest charges.2" In 1545, England adopted an act permitting
interest charges of up to 10 percent per year, the preamble of the
act stating that the "statutes ... [prohibitory of interest altogether
had] so little force.. . that.., little or no punishment ... ensued
to the offenders . . .. "4 Except for the years between 1552 and
1571, during which time there was an absolute prohibition against
interest taking, English statutes permitting interest charges at vary-
ing rates, reduced until the rate reached 5 percent in 1713,25 re-
mained in effect until all English usury statutes were repealed in
1854.6
The first American colony to adopt a usury law appears to have
been Massachusetts which adopted an 8 percent rate in 1641.2?
Thereafter, all colonies and the successive States adopted usury stat-
utes. 8 Prior to the middle of the 19th century, there appears to
have been relatively little lending to borrowers for consumption
19 Id. at 73-74.
20 Id. at 75.
21Id. at 76.
22 Horack, supra note 9, at 37.
23 S. HOMER, supra note 10, at 72, 78.
24 A Bill Against Usury, 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545).
2 5 J. M RRY, supra note 15, at 33-62.
2 6 See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
27 J. MURRY, supra note 15, at 76.
28 In 1866 all existing States had usury laws, usually at 6 percent, but California
had a 10 percent law and some other States had rates of 7 or 8 percent. Id. at ix.
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purposes" in the United States and usury laws were regarded as
protection for the small businessman and the farmer against high
interest rates."0 The statutes, however, often did not serve their
professed purpose. Usury rates were often near or below the pre-
vailing market rate for minimum risk loans and did not leave room
for loan prices to include the necessary charges for costs of lending
and for risk. 1  Further, there was no organized national money
market and farmers and business borrowers usually had to compete
for limited local money.3 Because of these factors, businessmen
and farmers in various areas complained that usury statutes only
increased the rates they had to pay because the usury laws forced
lenders to resort to inconvenient and illegal subterfuges to secure
returns that were reasonable but above the usury limits. Another
complaint was that the usury statutes drove from the lending mar-
ket some who would have otherwise been willing to lend out their
money and attracted to it the more avaricious and hardened who
were willing to violate the law to lend at illegal rates."3 In 1867
2 9 L ROBINSON & R. NUGENT, REGuLATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BusINEss
30 (1935).
80 Friedman, The Usury Laws of Wisconsin: A Study in Legal and Social History,
1963 Wis. L. REv. 515, 523-25, contains an excellent discussion of the arguments for
and against usury laws put forth in Wisconsin in the years between 1848 and 1875.
3 1 Except for a few years in the 1830's, when yields on federal government bonds
fell as low as 3.06 percent, yields on federal government obligations in the first part of
the 19th century ranged above 5 percent and sometimes above 6 percent. After the
Civil War, bond rates fell steadily, along with the general decline in prices, until 1900,
when yields fell as low as 1.98 percent. S. HOMER, supra note 10, at 302-17. Usury
statutes generally fixed the legal contract rate at 6 or 7 percent, though a few States had
a higher rate.
32Id. at 322-26.
3 3 In 1834, 202 businessmen of Boston submitted a petition to the Massachusetts
legislature urging repeal of the usury laws. The petition described evasions of the
usury laws as follows:
'We would respectfully direct the attention of the Legislature to the numer-
ous modes that have been devised for evading the laws; modes of transacting
business, which, besides being circuitous and inconvenient, and besides tak-
ing away the sanction and protection of the law from those who engage in
them, leaving no security but what is termed honor, thus increasing the risk,
and of course the premium paid - besides these evils, which are loss of time,
money, comfort and security - produce a fearful disregard of the laws, and
establish a precedent of the utmost danger, while they tend to throw pe-
cuniary negotiations in the hands of unprincipled and dangerous men. We
need not specify the various methods by which the law is now evaded, and
by which interest above six percent is taken, in defiance of law, under the
various names of "premium," "exchange," and "commission"; for these are
matters of notoriety, and need only be alluded to in order to secure the atten-
tion of the Legislature. So long as our laws remain unchanged, it is vain to
hope for a better state of things. MASS. S. Doc. No. 66 (1834), quoted in
L ROBINSoN & R NUGENT, supra note 29, at 30.
In 1859 a Tennessee legislative committee reported:
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Massachusetts repealed its usury laws primarily as a result of a pow-
erful political speech on the subject by Representative Richard H.
Dana, Jr." But attempts to repeal usury statutes in other States
never made any substantial headway. A number of States did re-
peal usury statutes for a short time, but later reenacted them.30
Presently, all States except two have general usury statutes."
B. Factors Involved in Determining the Price of Money
Before discussing the theory and present effect of usury laws,
the factors which are involved in fixing the interest rate at which a
loan will be made will be briefly examined. There are four com-
ponents involved in determining the free market rate at which a
particular loan will be made: (1) the cost of money; (2) the cost
of administering the loan; (3) the amount of risk that the loan will
not be repaid; and (4) the competition confronting the particular
lender.
(1) The cost of money. -The basic factor affecting interest
rate levels is the amount which borrowers are willing to pay and
lenders are willing to accept for the use of money in those instances
where the risk is for all practical purposes nonexistent and costs of
making and administering the loan are an insignificant proportion
of the total return. This "prime" rate is fixed by essentially the same
factors of supply and demand which fix other market prices. Some
special features of the money market, however, are worth observing.
In addition to the factor of supply of money, as against demand for
credit at a particular time, the duration for which the loan is re-
quested is also a factor in setting the market rate. The longer the
term of the loan, the less liquid the position of the lender and the
Comparatively . . . little money is now loaned out in Tennessee, at legal
rates. In some portions of east and middle Tennessee, and occasionally by a
conscientious guardian or private individual in other parts of the state, loans
may be effected at the legal rate, but in these instances it is generally done
more for accommodation to friends of known punctuality than for the sake
of gain .... It is impossible to ascertain the exact amount of money used in
Tennessee in note-shaving transactions. The law . . . like most other enact-
ments guarded by heavy penalties and unjust discriminations, has defeated
its own object. Id. at 31.
For a very interesting discussion of usury legislation in Wisconsin in the 19th century
together with a description of actual rates charged for farm loans at various times and
the devices used to secure more than the legal rate of interest, see Friedman, supra note
30.
34 F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 60-61 (1924). Dana was the author of Two
Years Before the Mast.
3t Horack, supra note 9, at 38-39.
30 See notes 62-99 W!ra & accompanying text.
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less ability he has to react to changes in the money market. Be-
cause of this loss in liquidity, in most economic circumstances rates
are higher for long term loans than for short term loans.
However, it is probably correct to assume that the principal fac-
tor in setting prime interest rates is the relationship between total
money supply and total borrowing demand. The sources which
make up the total supply of funds for investment may be placed in
several classes. First, there are funds from private sources which
would have been available in the market no matter what interest
rates were being paid, but which are more or less sensitive to interest
rates and will seek the highest possible return. Many individual
savings accounts are in this class, and good institutional examples
of such funds are pension funds and assets of life insurance com-
panies. Of course, even these funds are to some extent available
for loans only because interest is paid. If interest rates were zero,
most of us would keep dur surplus money in a sock rather than lend
it out. In any event, therefore, the rate must be sufficiently higher
than zero to induce the saver to give up his liquidity advantage by
lending out the money. However, it is probable that an increase
in the interest rate from 5 percent to, say, 6 percent has little effect
on the total amount of this type of money available for loans.
The second classification of savings is that which is induced
only 'by attractive interest rates. Some indeterminate amount of
money saved and made available for lending falls in this category.
Some savers who would forego present consumption at a 5 percent
return would not forego present consumption if the rate of return
were only 3 percent. In the case of a business saver, the situation
is more complex since, in addition to the option of either paying
its surplus money to the owners or shareholders or saving it and
making it available for loans, the business also has the option of
investing the surplus as additional capital in the business being op-
erated.
The present money market in the major industrialized nations
of the world has a peculiar source of lendable funds in a third cate-
gory, the demand deposits of commercial banks." These deposits
do not represent the "savings" of anyone, except in a very limited
sense, but collectively they make up a huge fund from which loans
can be, and are, made. These funds are generally not accumulated
in response to interest rates, since they are not deposited primarily
37 Demand deposits of commercial banks in the United States on December 27,
1967, were about $180 billion. FED. R SERvE BuLL. Feb. 1968, at A-18.
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to earn interest, but rather are accumulated for the convenience of
the depositors.
The prime interest rate is substantially affected by the discount
rate at which the Federal Reserve Board will loan money to banks
and by the fiscal policies of the Federal Reserve Board. The Board,
through various devices, can substantially reverse trends toward
inflation or recession by increasing or decreasing the amount of
money available for lending."8
The other side of the market prime interest rate-fixing mechan-
ism is the demand for funds. Borrowers who seek funds are of two
types, those who seek the funds for productive purposes, that is, to
enchance their earning capacity, and those who seek the funds for
consumptive purposes, that is, to anticipate their future income.
The strength of the demand for productive loans depends on the
spread between the interest rates on money and the general profit
levels of business. If the spread is great, the demand will be high,
and if it is narrow, the demand will be smaller. Of course, the
forces of the market tend to narrow the gap between interest rates
and profit. The forces as to consumptive borrowing are not subject
to factors as objective as the spread between profits and interest, for
the rate which a consumer-borrower is willing to pay depends sub-
stantially on his subjective feeling as to the desirability of antici-
pating future income.
Hopefully, this brief review of the factors involved in setting
market interest rates makes it clear that the money market is a com-
plex marketplace in which interest rates are set in much the way
that prices are set in other markets. 9 While it is true that a large
part of the lendable funds available at any particular time are not
increased by higher interest rates, higher rates do attract substantial
additional money into the lending market. This is particularly so
in the present United States money market where equity stock pur-
chases are an easily available alternative to investment in loans or
lending institutions. Therefore, money available for lending is
affected by the interest rate - higher rates do not result merely
in higher prices with no expansion in supply. Further, even if
38 For a general discussion of the supply factors in interest rate determination, see
B. DEMPSEY, INTEREST AND USURY 1-114 (1943); J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THE-
ORY OF EmPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY, Book IV (1935); Divine, The Ethics
of Interest, 10 MARQ. Bus. REV. 31 (1966). For a good short summary of the opera-
tions of the Federal Reserve System which raise or lower interest rates, see W. MUR-
RAY & A. NELSON, AGRICULTURAL FINANcE 295-306 (1960).
39 In addition to the citiations in note 38 supra, see F. RYAN, supra note 34, at 64-
75; Merriman & Hanks, supra note 7, at 1-6.
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money supply were not responsive to rate changes, free market rates
should efficiently apportion the available funds to the best use. This
fact is of substantial importance in the consideration of the desirabil-
ity of usury statutes.
As of the time this article is being written, the Federal Reserve
discount rate is 5 percent,4" bank short term (less than 1 year) rates
in New York City are 5 Y8 to 6 percent,41 5-year federally guaran-
teed bonds of the Federal National Mortgage Association have just
sold to yield around 6.45 percent,42 and private corporate bonds
are selling to yield around 6.74 percent.4" These rates may be con-
sidered to represent the prime market interest rate range presently.
Therefore, States with 6 or 7 percent general usury laws are at-
tempting to force lenders to lend at rates below or only slightly
above prime rates. It is unreasonable to expect lenders in such situ-
ations to actually lend below prime rates - a more likely result is
that credit will be dried up.
(2) Cost of Administering the Loan, -The second factor in
determining the interest rate at which a loan will be made is the
administrative cost of making the loan. This cost becomes partic-
ularly significant in smaller loans, especially installment loans,
where substantial time is spent in evaluating the loan request and
in handling the disbursement and bookkeeping expenses included
in the loan. For example, a recent study showed the average annual
operating expenses, other than bad debt reserves, of some major
national finance companies to be $10.47 per $100 of average loan
balance.44 Applying this average figure to a single payment loan
of $100 for a year, the total operating costs apportionable to that
loan would be $10.47. Assuming that the finance company borrows
the money to make the loan at a prime interest rate45 of 6 percent,
this is an additional cost of $6. Therefore, the total cost of this loan
to the lender would be $16.47 and he would have to charge an in-
terest rate of 16.47 percent just to break even, without taking into
consideration any bad debt reserve. Although as the loan gets bigger
40 N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1968, at 69, col. 5.
41 WaU Street Journal, Mar. 29, 1968, at 18, col. 5.
42 N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
43 Id., Mar. 28, 1968, at 74, col. 1.
44 J. CHAPmAN & i SHAY, THE CoNsumm FINANcE INDuSTRY 38 (1967). The
cost makeup was as follows: salaries, $5.60; occupancy costs, $.98; advertising, $.71;
other, $3.18. Some other companies reported on in the study had operating expenses,
excluding bad debt reserves, as high as $26.80 per $100 of loan. Id. at 100.
45 See discussion in text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
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the ratio of cost to loan goes down and costs go down when single
payment rather than installment loans are made, the above example
does serve to illustrate the effect of administrative costs on interest
rates.
(3) Risk That the Loan Will Not Be Repaid. -The third
factor in determining the market value of a particular loan is the
risk which the lender is assuming. Since this factor is always a
characteristic of the particular borrower, rather than the particular
lender, loans are not at all interchangeable as to rate. The fact
that X Steel Corporation sells steel to General Motors at $75 cash
per ton is a good indication that it will also sell to American Motors
at $75 cash per ton. However, the fact that X Bank lends money to
General Motors at 6 percent is no indication that it would or should
loan to American Motors at 6 percent. Similarly, the fact that X
Bank lends Bill Jones $1,000 for 1 year at 10 percent does not
mean that it could or should loan to his neighbor, Frank Smith, on
the same terms. In each case some judgment must be made as to
the risk that all or some of the loan will not be paid and the amount
which is to be charged for taking this risk must be determined.
The major national finance companies previously referred to
had average bad debt writeoffs of $2.27 per $100 in 1964, and
some loan companies reported bad debt writeoffs as high as $6 per
$100.46 These figures indicate that in some parts of the lending
market, at least, the risk factor is a good deal more than negligible.
(4) Competition to the Lender. -The final factor involved
in fixing the interest rate in a particular transaction is the existence
of alternative sources of supply to which the borrower can turn, or
of alternative borrowers to whom the lender can turn. If money
markets were monopoly markets then usury statutes would have
the same justification as regulation of telephone company or elec-
tric power company rates. However, this writer does not believe
that the present money supply system can be characterized as a
monopoly. Borrowers, large and small, generally have access to
a number of different lenders who are not, by any means, acting
in concert. However, competitive forces can be made to operate
more efficiently by allowing lenders free access to the credit market
and by requiring disclosure of the rates charged on comparable
terms by all lenders if the borrower is not otherwise likely to under-
stand rate differences.
46 J. CHApMAN & R. SHAY, supra note 44, at 38, 100.
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C. Theory of Usury Statutes
The major theoretical ground for prohibition of, or limitation
on, the amount of interest which may 'be charged on a loan was
for many centuries, and perhaps still is, a religious one. The Old
Testament prohibition of interest taking on loans had an over-
powering influence in the Middle Ages. The arguments in behalf
of, and in explanation of, the Biblical injunction against the taking
of interest was at the very core of the scholastic thinking of the
Middle Ages.47 With the Reformation, however, the religious
ground for the prohibition against interest was cut away, and the
religious prohibition was shifted toward unconscionably high rates.48
Indeed, modern usury laws reflect the gradual modification of a
medieval, religiously based theory that no interest at all could be
charged for the lending of money.
While medieval attitudes on usury were no doubt based sub-
stantially on the belief that the taking of interest was prohibited
by the authoritative word of God, they were also reinforced by pic-
tures of the overreaching and hardhearted usurer49 who took ad-
vantage of the necessitious condition of the borrower to exact an
unconscionable charge. This reason for usury limitations, which
has been called the prohibition of "moral usury," has always been,
and still remains, one of the strongest underlying theories for usury
4 7 B. NM-SoN, THE IDEA Op USURY (1949) traces the impact of the Deuteronomic
usury prohibition from the time of the early Christian church to its final gasp for life
in the quixotic writings of Father O'Callaghan, a Catholic priest, in the early 19th cen-
tury.
48 Id.
4 9 Surely one of the most telling bits of invective ever written is the following quo-
tation from a 4th century sermon of St. Basil:
The griping usurer sees, unmoved, his necessitous borrower at his feet, con-
descending to every humiliation, professing everything that is villifying; he
feels no compassion for his fellow-creatures; though reduced to this abject
state of supplication, he yields not to his humble prayer; he is inexorable to
his entreaties; he melts not at his tears; he swears and protests that he has no
money, and that he is under necessity of borrowing himself; he acquires
credit to his lies by superadding an oath, and aggravates his inhuman and
iniquitous traffic with the grossest perjury. But when the wretched suppli-
cant enters upon the terms of the loan, his countenance is changed; he smiles
with complacency; he reminds him of his intimacy with his father, and treats
him with the most flattering cordiality. "Let me see," says he, "if I have
not some little cash in store, for I ought to have some belonging to a friend
who lent it to me on very hard terms, to whom I pay most exorbitant interest
for it but I shall not demand anything like that from you." By fair words
and promises, he seduces and completely entangles him in his snares; he then
gets his hand to paper and completes his wretchedness. How so? By dis-
missing him bereft of liberty. Quoted it; Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250
Ky. 343, 351, 63 S.W.2d 3, 6 (1933).
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statutes," in spite of the fact that in only one State does a usury
statute actually apply to small loan transactions of the kind in
which the necessitious borrower situation practically always arises.5
Related to the "prevention of overreaching" argument is the
medieval theological concept of "just price" under which at various
times and in various places the prices of essential commodities were
controlled by statute.52 In this context, it was natural for the pro-
hibition against any interest charge to be transmuted into a doctrine
that the state should fix a fair price for the use of money. Free en-
terprise countries have long since abandoned the concept of state
price fixing except in times of national emergency and in the case
of monopoly enterprises, but the idea that the state can and should
fix a fair price for money apparently still has a strong appeal to
legislators. It has been argued that the money market is actually
a monopoly market and that, therefore, price fixing is justified."
However, in view of the variety and diverse character of lenders
today this seems not to have any present foundation in fact.
A special variety of the fair price doctrine is an argument that
loans for productive purposes should not be permitted at a rate
higher than the average percentage of net profits which can be
earned in the borrower's business.54 This argument has a ring of
authenticity since it is clear that a businessman is headed for bank-
ruptcy if he pays more for money than he is able to earn by putting
it to use. Its failure is in assuming that there is a standard net profit
figure applicable to businesses in general and in assuming that a
legislature can discover what this figure is. A more sophisticated
argument was made by Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations55 in
which he argued that to permit high interest rates would attract
too much capital to speculative ventures at the expense of more
stable and more established industries which could not afford to
pay speculation interest rates.
More recently, John Maynard Keynes has suggested that for
many centuries interest rate ceilings were justified because an irra-
tional thirst for land caused so many men to borrow to buy land
50 See F. RYAN, supra note 34, at 10-17, where the author discusses the concept of
"moral usury," that is, the taking advantage of the necessitous condition or inexperience
of the borrower.
51 See text accompanying notes 100-30 infra.
52 See Bonn, Price Regulation, 12 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 355 (1934); Salin, Just Price,
8 ENcyc. Soc. Sc. 504 (1932).
53 See Friedman, sutpra note 30, at 520.
54 See id. at 546.
55 A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS book II, ch. IV (1784).
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that, in the absence of usury statutes, rates would have gone too
high for possible productive investment in agriculture or business."6
Keynes also seemed to suggest that usury statutes may serve a use-
ful purpose in establishing expectations as to returns which, as he
saw it, have a substantial effect on actual interest rates charged.5"
Usury statutes may also indicate a social judgment as to the kind
of people who should be entitled to credit. If a State has a general
usury law applicable to the small businessman which sets an inter-
est ceiling of 10 percent, it could be argued that the State has
thereby stated a policy that borrowers whose credit standing does
not enable them to borrow at 10 percent should be discouraged
from borrowing to continue in business. That this has actually
been a conscious consideration in the forming of usury statutes is
doubtful though this feature of small loan legislation is well
known.5
8
In summary, it can be said that usury laws attempt either to fix
the market price for money, or to fix a ceiling for conscionable
transactions, based on the belief that rates higher than the ceiling
are never justified from the lender's point of view, or, if they are
justified, should not be permitted as a matter of social policy.
I. UsuRY LAWS AND THEIR EFFECTS
Usury laws in the United States, which range from 6 to 21 per-
cent, obviously present a mixture of motives. Six percent statutes
perhaps come close to being price-fixing statutes since they are so
close to actual money rates. Rates of 12 percent or 21 percent,
however, do not attempt to fix the market price of money, but only
set limits on the kinds of money contracts which can be made.
A. Factors Controlling the Effect of Usury Laws
To set the framework for an examination of existing usury
statutes and their effect, some of the factors which are likely to
affect their importance and impact on interest rates will be con-
sidered. These factors are the general usury rates, the penalty im-
posed for violation of usury laws, the extent of statutory exemptions
and of special rates for particular kinds of lending, the judicial atti-
56 J. KEyNs, supra note 38, at 241.
57Id. at 203.
58 For a discussion of this aspect of consumer interest rate regulating statutes, see
Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MicL
L. REv. 81 (1967).
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 819
rude toward interest rate ceilings, the extent to which lenders vol-
untarily observe the statutory ceilings, and the availability and ease
of access to alternative uses of capital.
(1) The Rate. -The lower the maximum rate allowed the
more likely it will widely dislocate free market operations in tight
money situations. The New York 6 percent usury statute, for ex-
ample, is presently having a substantial effect on home mortgage
loans."0 On the other hand, the Rhode Island 21 percent ceiling
has very little effect on the general lending market.
(2) The Penalty for Violation of the Usury Statute. -If, as
in nine States,"° the penalty is only loss of the excess above the legal
rate, the deterrent effect is probably very small indeed. On the
other hand, if the penalty is loss of the entire principal and interest,
as it is in some States, lenders must be greatly concerned about
possible violations.
(3) The Statutory Exemptions from the General Usury Stat-
utes. -The extent to which a usury statute really interferes with
free market bargaining for credit depends substantially on the
various exemptions from it. Existing exemptions are of two types.
Most common are exemptions based on the size and type of loan,
but exemptions also are made on the basis of the character of the
borrower or lender. If a State has special statutory high rates for
loans of smaller amounts under small loan or installment loan leg-
islation, and exempts loans to corporations from the general usury
laws, the effect of the usury laws may be little more than to cause
a large number of small loans and many incorporations.
(4) The Judicial Attitude Toward Avoidance Devices. -As
will be pointed out later, at various times, courts have been liberal
in allowing use of various subterfuges to avoid usury statutes. If
such devices are available, usury statutes, for the knowledgeable,
only result in more expensive and roundabout ways of handling
transactions.
(5) The Voluntary Observance of Statutory Ceilings. -Busi-
ness custom and practice often permit charges above usury limits
which have not been approved by either courts or legislatures.6
If this happens the usury laws on the books have no impact except
59 See text accompanying notes 193-97 infra.
60 See notes 71-76 infra & accompanying text.
61 Some examples are the discount in home mortgages in many States and the
charges of I or 1 percent per month on cash loan revolving credit in many States.
So long as borrowers do not complain, such charges are frequently made even though
they possibly, or even probably, violate usury laws. See text accompanying notes 193-
97 infra.
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in sporadic instances when some particular borrower decides not
to play by the working rules and turns to the judicial or legislative
ones.
(6) The Availability and Ease of Access to Alternatives for
the Use of Investable Funds. -If the holder of capital has avail-
able alternatives such as equity stock purchases, the secondary bond
market, loans in areas free from usury control, or loans in other
jurisdictions with a higher rate, the effect of usury laws will be sub-
stantially different from what it would be in the absence of alter-
natives. To the extent that alternative sources of investment are
available, usury laws are not effective to produce loans at the usury
rate when the general market rate is higher. In such a situation,
there will probably continue to be some loans at the usury rate, but
the amount of money available will be substantially reduced as funds
flow to the areas where greater returns are available.
B. Present General Usury Statutes and Their Exceptions and
Exemptions
Existing State legislation regulating maximum interest rates is
typically a jumble of statutes fixing a basic usury rate and then
exempting from the basic rate small loans, installment loans, loans
by industrial banks, and perhaps totally exempting banks, savings
and loan associations, or other particular types of lenders. One
difficulty with existing legislation is that it is so complex and so
scattered throughout the statute books that it is practically impos-
sible, within any reasonable period of time, to develop a complete
picture of interest rate regulation in all the States.62 The summary
of the existing situation in the United States which follows, because
of these difficulties, is not exhaustive in treatment, but, in general, it
does draw an accurate picture of the present interest rate regulation
structure.
All States except two, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, have
general usury statutes or constitutional provisions fixing a general
maximum interest rate. Of these 48 States, 10 have a 6 percent
general usury law; 3 six, a 7 percent law;"4 12 and the District of
02 For an excellent collection and summary of the various rate regulatory statutes
applicable to consumer borrowers in the United States, see B. CuRRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965). CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GuIDE re-
ports most State legislation in the consumer credit field and also contains a summary
of general usury laws.
63 Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia. Statutory citations for these States and
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Columbia, an 8 percent law; 8 one, a 9 percent law;" 10, a 10 per-
cent law;"7 and six, a 12 percent law." New Mexico has a split
general law, 10 percent with collateral and 12 percent without."
Maine has a 16 percent and Rhode Island a 21 percent general usury
statute.
70
The impact of these usury laws depends very substantially on
the penalty for violation. And, since the pressures toward evasion
of usury statutes are stronger in States where the rate is lower, pen-
alties by rate groupings will be examined. Generally, the lower
the interest ceiling, the smaller the penalty imposed for a violation,
though there are notable exceptions.
In five of the ten 6 percent States, the only penalty for usury
is loss of the excess interest over 6 percent.7' In three others the
penalty is loss of all interest.7" And in Vermont, the penalty is all
interest plus one-half of the principal.73 In straight-laced New
York, usury makes the contract void.74 It appears, therefore, that in
one-half of the 6 percent States the sting of the usury laws is very
slight indeed. In only two of the 6 percent States is usury a criminal
offense.7" (A recent New York statute aimed at Mafia-type loans
makes it a felony to lend at rates above 25 percent.76 )
One of the six 7 percent States forfeits the excess over 6 percent
for usury;77 three forfeit all interest;7" Iowa forfeits all interest plus
for all States listed through footnote 96 will be found in the table which appears as
Appendix A.
64 Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, South Carolina. Id.
6 5 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Ohio, South Dakota. Id.
6 6 Nebraska. Id.
67 Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Wyoming. Id.
68 Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Nevada, Washington, Wisconsin. Id.
09 Id.
70 See id. Maine has no limit on the interest rate on loans under $2,000.
71 Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia. Id.
72 New Jersey, North Carolina (where if a violation occurs the borrower can re-
cover back double the amount actually paid), Virginia. Id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
7 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4602 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 34(c) (Supp.
1967). Unless otherwise indicated, all States which make usury a crime make it a
misdemeanor.
76 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2401 (McKinney 1967).
7 7 Kentucky. See Appendix A infra.
78 Illinois, Michigan, South Carolina (plus costs). Id.
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16 percent of the principal;"9 and in North Dakota all interest plus
25 percent of principal is forfeited.80 Two of these States make
usury a misdemeanor.81
Of the thirteen 8 percent jurisdictions, two, Missouri and
Ohio,82 penalize usury by forefeiture of the excess interest, and one,
Indiana, forfeits the excess above 6 percent.83 Eight jurisdictions
forfeit all interest,84 while Idaho forfeits treble interest,88 and Min-
nesota makes the contract void.88 Only South Dakota of this group
makes usury a misdemeanor.8 7
Nebraska, the single 9 percent State, requires forfeiture of all
interest for a violation of the usury law. 8 Four of the ten 10 per-
cent States forfeit all interest," and another three forfeit twice the
interest.0 Kansas requires forfeiture of double the excess over 10
percent. 1  Arkansas forfeits all interest and principal, 2 and Or-
egon, in a complicated scheme, forfeits the loan, less interest and
payments on principal, to the school fund. 3
Of the 12 percent States, Nevada forfeits the excess over 12
percent; 4 Colorado forfeits treble the excess charge; Hawaii and
Washington require forfeiture of all interest plus principal under
$2,000; and in Connecticut the entire principal and interest is for-
feited."5 Four of these States make usury a misdemeanor.9
New Mexico, a 10-12 percent State, forfeits all interest and
79 See id.
80 See id.
8 1 IowA CODE ANN. § 535.5 (1966); N.D. CEtIT. CODE § 47-14-11 (1959).
8 2 See Appendix A infra.
83 Id.
8 4 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi
(all interest and principal when the interest charged is above 20 percent), South Da-
kota. Id.




89 California, Florida (if interest charged is more than 25 percent, all interest and
principal), Utah, Wyoming. Id.
9 0 Montana, Oklahoma, Texas (forfeit all principal and interest if the rate charged






9 0 Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Wisconsin. Id.
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makes usury a misdemeanor.9" Maine, a 16 percent State, forfeits
all interest and principal," while Rhode Island forfeits all interest
and principal for violation of its 21 percent limitation and makes
violation a misdemeanor.99 All 48 States with general usury laws
except Arkansas have a series of statutory or judicial exceptions
which substantially diminish the impact of the general rate limita-
tion. The most common of these exceptions are discussed in the
following sections.
(1) The Small Consumer Borrower Exemption from Usury
Statutes. -Many consumer borrowers undoubtedly need legisla-
tive protection from sellers and lenders who overreach on credit
transactions. A substantial portion of small loans to consumers
are emergency loans to tide the borrower over a financial rough
spot caused either by an unexpected expense, temporary unemploy-
ment, or by the borrower's inability to handle his financial affairs.
Such a borrower needs money quickly to protect himself from in-
convenience, discomfort, or loss of property to existing creditors.
This necessitious borrower usually is willing to pay almost any rate
to get a loan and often would in the absence of legislative controls.
Also, it is an unfortunate fact that many consumers are unin-
telligent or naive in money matters and, in the absence of some
legislative limits on rates, would pay very high rates without fully
understanding either the rate or its effect. However, if one accepts
the fact that consumers are of differing credit worthiness, he must
also accept the fact that legislative ratemaking in the consumer
area cannot take the form of price fixing for every class of customer
without resulting in serious inequality among borrowers. There-
fore, rates set by statute in the consumer area probably should be
set at some outside conscionable limit with the expectation that most
transactions will take place at lower rates. It is clear, however, that
the present general usury rates are too low to allow any substantial
amount of consumer financing to be done under them.' 0
One of the most fantastic episodes of 19th century laissez faire
business profit taking occurred in the small loan business between
1870 and around 1910. The general usury statute maximums
then (6 to 12 percent), as now, were not high enough to permit
profitable lending of small amounts at legal rates. In the large
9 7 See id.
98d.
99 Id.
100 On the costs of the consumer credit industry, see J. CUAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE
CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY (1967).
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industrial cities, however, there were many wage earners who could
not control their financial situation and who were often in des-
perate need of small amounts of cash to pay medical bills or to tide
them over periods of unemployment. The need could not be sat-
isfied within the usury structure, so it was satisfied outside it. Small
loan lenders operated openly and advertised in nearly every city of
any size in the United States in spite of the fact that in every State
except Massachusetts they were lending at illegal rates. 1 ' The
interest rates charged ranged from a reasonable 3 percent per month
to 33 percent per month and even higher. And it is significant
that the rates in Boston, in a State with no usury laws, while high,
were not as high as in many cities in States with tight usury
statutes.' In some States the penalty for usury was only loss of
interest, so the high rate lender was taking only a small chance in
lending at above the legal rates. However, even in States where
there was a substantial penalty, illegal loans were widely made.'
Some States attempted to end illegal lending by making it a felony
to charge higher than usury rates, but since the demand was pres-
ent, some people were willing to meet that demand even at the
101 L ROBINSON & R. NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS
38-73 (1935).
102 Id. at 57-58. A portion of the authors' table showing rates actually charged in
various cities follows:
RATES OF ITEEST CHARGED BY LENDERS IN VARIOUS CITIES,




































3 to 10 per cent a month
No rates reported
180 per cent a year; 200 to 300 per cent a
year
15 per cent a month prevailing on $10 or
less; 8 to 10 per cent a month; 200 per cent
a year
10 per cent a month
10 to 60 per cent a month
20 per cent a month; 120 to 200 per cent a
year
5 to 12 per cent a month
10 per cent a month
10 per cent a month
3, 10, 20, and 33 per cent a month; 473 to
1,733 per cent a year
120 to 400 per cent a year
110 per cent a year
88 per cent a year
72 to 300 per cent a year
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risk of substantial criminal punishment."0 4
In the early years of this century, the Russell Sage Foundation
became interested in small loan problems and sponsored the de-
velopment of the Uniform Small Loan Law which attacked the
problem of high rate consumer loans by (1) fixing realistic legal
rates (originally 31 percent per month on small loans); (2) requir-
ing small loan lenders to be licensed and subject to regulation by
State authorities; and (3) subjecting lenders to criminal penalties for
violation of the small loan law.' 5 Laws patterned more or less
closely after the Uniform Small Loan Law were soon adopted in
a number of States and there is presently legislation in all States
except Arkansas which permits small loans to be made at rates
higher than the general usury rates." 6 The original maximum
loan amount under the Uniform Small Loan Law was $300 and a
number of States still have this limitation, though other States have
much higher small loan law ceilings.0 7
The enactment of the small loan laws substantially improved
the position of the consumer-borrower of small sums by supplanting
low usury rates with higher rates which provided a reasonable profit
for credit suppliers. Social science researchers have made it clear
that such laws do lower interest rates to consumers and that, in
their absence, in more recent times, rates have been five or six
times higher than the small loan rates.'
(2) Industrial and Installment Loan Laws. -In addition to the
small loan laws just discussed, most States have installment or in-
dustrial loan laws or both under which rates in excess of those
allowed by the usury statutes may be charged. Industrial loan acts
are statutory approvals of the Morris Bank Plan which was devel-
oped around 1910 by Arthur Morris to secure a yield greater than
that permitted under the usury laws. Under the Morris Plan, a
10 4 D. GALLERT, W. HILBORN & G. MAY, SMALL LoAN LEGISLATION 27-28
(1932).
105 Id. at 89-94. The most recent (7th) draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law is
set out in B. CURRAN, supra note 62, at 144-57.
106 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE S 41 (Aug. 17, 1966); see B. CURRAN,
supra note 62. Rates presently range from approximately 12 percent to 40 percent.
Most rates range around 3 percent per month for the first $300 and generally scale
down in a series of steps on larger amounts if the law covers loans higher than $300.
107 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE 5 41 (Aug. 17, 1966); B. CURRAN, supra
note 62, at 20-21.
10 8 D. GALLERT, W. ILBORN & G. MAY, supra note 104; L ROBINSON & R. Nu-
GENT, supra note 101; see Simpson, Cost of Loans to Borrowers Under Unregulated Lend-
ing, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 73 (1941) for a study of small loan rates in some South-
ern States in the late thirties.
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borrower pays interest at the highest legal rate for the full term
of the loan and, in a "separate" transaction agrees to make monthly
deposits with the lender which will be sufficient to repay the loan
at its maturity date. Under this scheme the borrower pays approx-
imately double the interest he would have paid had interest been
computed on the basis of the declining balances of his debt as he
paid into the payoff account.' A stated rate of 6 percent, under
10 9 The following is a description of the beginning and operation of the Morris
Plan:
While Pierre Jay was proposing a credit union law for Massachusetts,
Arthur J. Morris, an attorney of Norfolk, Virginia, was studying the banking
law of his state in an effort to find a practical method of lending to appli-
cants for loans on salaries and wages. Because he was counsel for several
banks, he was aware that banks refused loans to many worthy applicants who
could not offer the kinds of security customarily required. He considered
the lack of credit facilities by these applicants to be a distinct weakness of the
American banking system.
Mr. Morris worked out a plan by which he believed loans could be made
profitably by a banking institution under existing legislation. He raised
capital among business men of Norfolk and applied to the Virginia State
Corporation Commission for a bank charter. The charter was granted, and
on March 23, 1910, the Fidelity Savings and Trust Company opened its doors.
The technique of this institution was ingenious. Funds were to be ac-
quired by the sale of three classes of certificates. Common stock was repre-
sented by class A certificates, which were entitled to the earnings of the cor-
poration. Class B certificates, which resembled the certificates of deposit
used by some banks, bore interest at a fixed rate. Class C certificates, which
were to be purchased by instalment payments, bore interest after a certain
amount had been paid unless hypothecated as security for a loan.
Two or more endorsements were required as security for loans. Interest
was discounted in advance at the legal rate plus an investigation fee amount-
ing usually to $2.00 for each $100 borrowed. The borrower was required
to repay the loan by weekly instalments which were credited, not to the prin-
cipal of the loan, but to the purchase of non-interest-bearing class C certifi-
cates. The par value of each certificate was $50. If the face value of the
loan was $200, the borrower contracted to buy four certificates at the rate of
$4.00 a week for fifty weeks. When the purchase was completed, the certifi-
cates were cancelled and the proceeds used to liquidate the loan. Fines were
levied for delinquency at the rate of 5 per cent a week on the amount in ar-
rears.
The purpose of this elaborate mechanism was to increase the amount of
interest charged without conflicting with the usury law. The maximum in-
terest rate in Virginia was 6 per cent a year, but the courts had occasionally
allowed banking institutions to charge in addition certain expenses of investi-
gation. Mr. Morris relied upon these decisions to validate his proposed in-
vestigation fee. The device of crediting payments to a non-interest-bearing
certificate was designed to disguise the increase in the true rate of interest
which results from instalment repayments of principal when interest is dis-
counted in advance. Stripped of these technicalities, the actual interest rate
on a loan discounted at $8.00 per hundred and payable in 50 equal weekly
instalments amounted to 17.7 per cent if the contract was met promptly and
a higher rate if the borrower was delinquent in his payments.
Although the validity of these devices for increasing interest income was
doubtful in most jurisdictions, the Fidelity Savings and Trust Company or-
ganized by Mr. Morris and his associates was quite secure because of its in-
19683
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 819
this scheme, would produce an actual yield over a year of 10.9 per-
cent simple annual interest if the interest is added to the principal,
and 11.58 percent if it is deducted from the principal."' Approxi-
mately one-half of the States have laws specifically applying to in-
dustrial banks which either approve the scheme described above
or fix substitute statutory rates which allow a return larger than
that permitted by general usury statutes."' Most of the statutes do
not impose dollar limits on loans which may be made under in-
dustrial loan laws, though a few do." 2 While in most States with
industrial bank laws, the industrial banks could lend at their higher
rates to business operations, their primary market and market ex-
pertise has been in consumer loans.
Installment loan laws which authorize lenders to charge higher
than usury rates on installment loans exist in about four-fifths of
the States. In all States with such laws banks may lend at the in-
stallment loan rates and in some States only banks may lend at
such rates. In other States, various types of lenders, and, in a few
States, all lenders, may lend at the installment loan rates.
The rate provisions usually provide that a dollar discount or
add-on may be charged at the beginning of the loan. These pro-
visions, like the industrial loan provisions, result in a simple annual
interest yield on installment loans which is approximately double
the stated add-on or discount rate. In 17 States there is no max-
imum on the amount which may be loaned under installment loan
corporation under the banking law. In order to protect depositors of banks,
banking legislation generally limited the penalties for usury when banks
were involved, and in most states only the portion of interest which was in
excess of the legal rate could be recovered from banking institutions. The
amount recoverable was so small that an action to recover excess interest was
unprofitable. Moreover, the company had the moral support of the com-
munity. However high the actual rate of interest in terms of the legal maxi-
mum, the charge was small when compared with the cost of borrowing from
the loan shark. The institution provided a decent source of funds for large
numbers of borrowers who had no credit elsewhere except at far greater rates.
L. ROBINSON & R. NUGENT, supra note 101, at 90-92.
110 In a 6 percent add-on loan for a year, the borrower receives $100 and pays back
$106. In a 6 percent discount loan for a year, the borrower, receives $94 and pays back
$100. In the first case he gets the use of $100 for $6, while in the second case he gets
the use of $94 for $6.
"'l B. CutRAN, supra note 62, at 52-60, 204-19. The author lists the following
States as having industrial loan laws: Arizona, Arkansas (Arkansas does not, however,
permit industrial banks to charge more than the usury rate of 10 percent a year), Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
112 Id. at 57.
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provisions - and in those States, the installment loan law becomes,
in effect, a special general usury law applying to all loans repay-
able in installments."' In the other States there are limits on the
amounts which may be loaned at installment loan rates ranging
from as low as $1,000 in Wyoming to $15,000 in Illinois. The
installment loan rates are usually around 12 percent simple annual
interest and in only two States are they higher than 15 percent on
amounts larger than $1,000.11'
In addition to the small loan, industrial loan, and installment
loan laws, most States have special provisions for credit unions and
pawnbrokers which allow them to charge more than the general
usury rates for loans. Also, many States have special statutory
provisions authorizing higher rates for home improvement loans,
check loans, second mortgage loans, and others."5
The small loan, industrial loan, and installment loan laws and
other special consumer lending laws, together carve out a massive
area of credit which is not subject to the general usury laws." 6
These statutes, not the general usury laws, are now, it should be
observed, the statutes which apply to control practically all con-
sumer borrowing except home mortgage loans. This is particularly
significant since perhaps the single most influential reason given
for retention of usury laws is protection of the necessitous con-
sumer-borrower.
(3) The "Time-Price" Exception to General Usury Laws. -As
just pointed out, all States except Arkansas have concluded that the
best solution to the problems of consumer credit is the statu-
tory creation of exceptions to the general usury laws permitting
lenders to charge higher rates under controlled conditions. Like-
"
3 The 17 States and the maximum simple annual interest yield on installment loans
are as follows:
10.90% 11.58% 10.90% 26.14% 15.68% 11.58%
Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Virginia
10.90%0 9.58% 11.58% 12%o 12.68% 11.58%
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, W. Virginia
11.58% 10.90%0 12.68% 14.45 % 11.58%
N. Carolina, Oregon, S. Carolina, Texas, Vermont
These rates are interpolated from the information given in 1 CCH INSTALLMENT
CREDIT GuDE 9 48 (Aug. 17, 1966).
114 Hawaii (26.14 percent) and Indiana (15.68 percent). Id.
115 See B. CuRRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 45-52, 75-76,
79-82 (1965). For a typical second mortgage statute, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 55
1321.51-.60 (Page Supp. 1967).
316B. CuRRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGiSLATION (1965), gives an ex-
cellent general survey of the many laws creating special rates for consumer transactions.
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wise, all States except Arkansas give similar treatment to credit
sales of goods either through the "time-price doctrine" or through
various retail installment sales acts which have replaced the time-
price rules."'
Under the time-price doctrine a seller of goods may fix one
price for a sale for cash and another for a sale on credit and the
difference in price is not considered to be an interest charge, but
rather is considered to be merely a higher price for the goods which
the merchant may charge to cover the risks of selling on credit."'
The principle was first announced in an 1827 English case" 9 and
the first American case recognizing the doctrine appeared in Mis-
souri in 1856.1"' From its mid-19th century beginnings, the time-
price doctrine swept across the country and it was not until the
1950's that two States, Arkansas and Nebraska, overruled their
prior cases, and held a credit sale of goods to be subject to usury or
small loan statutes. 2 '
The time-price doctrine and the rule that a purchase of a note
or contract obligation at less than its face value is not subject to
usury laws became the twin pillars supporting the great modern
117 Id. at 83-123.
118 As stated in the leading American case, Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115,
118-19 (1861):
1It is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 in
cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual instalments, and if B prefers to
pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract may not be called usurious. A
vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a
purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit; and one who
will not distinguish between things that differ, may say, with apparent truth,
that B pays a hundred percent for forbearance, and may assert that such a
contract is usurious; but whatever truth there may be in the premises, the
conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Such a contract has none of the charac-
teristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt
119 Beete v. Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827). The concept, however, has
a long history. Mention of the "time-price doctrine" appears as early as the 12th century
when Pope Alexander III rejected it and ruled that credit sales at prices above the cash
price were usurious. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 70 (1963). How-
ever, later scholastics managed to work in a higher price for credit sales as a part of the
"just-price doctrine." Salin, Just Price, 8 ENCYC. Soc. Sa. 504, 506 (1932).
"2OvMitchell v. Griffith, 22 Mo. 515 (1856). The court held that the doctrine did
not apply where all of the $6,289 purchase price of land was paid except $379.72 for
which 2V2 months credit was given.
121 B. CURRAN, supra note 116, contains a general discussion of the significance of
the time-price doctrine. For a more detailed discussion, see Britton & Ulrich, The Illi-
nois Retail Installment Sales Act - Historical Background and Comparative Legislation,
53 Nw. U.L. REV. 137 (1958); Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail In-
stallment Sales, 68 YALE L. J. 839 (1959); Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments
in the Law, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 303 (1960). Nebraska has now adopted a retail instal-
ment sales act permitting higher than usury rate credit charges in installment sales. See
B. CIRRAN, supra note 116.
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credit sale society.'22 The dealer sold on credit at a "time-price" and
then sold the resulting conditional sales contract or account to a
finance company. Since neither transaction was subject to usury
laws, the rate charged to customers could be sufficiently high to
provide a good return for the extension of credit and the finance
company could purchase at a discount big enough to give it a good
profit. Through this use of the two rules, banks and sales finance
companies were able to avoid usury and small loan laws.12 The
time-price doctrine, therefore, came to be used to allow banks and
finance companies to charge rates for financing which they could
not have charged had they been dealing directly with the buyer.
It is difficult to understand why courts should have been con-
vinced that a credit sale of goods did not fall within the purview of
usury statutes which generally are drafted in language similar to
the following: "The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or things in action, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, shall be six dollars upon one hundred dollars, for
one year, and at that rate, for a greater or less sum, or for a longer
or shorter time."'2 4 While a credit sale of goods is not a loan of
money, it seems to be a forbearance of money and has the same
economic consequences as a loan. However, in the early and mid-
dle 19th century, sales on credit may have been so infrequent that
they did not appear to the courts to fall within the areas of usury
statute concern. Perhaps this conclusion was facilitated by the
fact that even cash prices were often not fixed firmly and were sub-
ject to haggling between buyer and seller. 2 '
Whatever the situation when the time-price doctrine was being
developed, its use in the closing years of the 19th century to cover
installment sales of sewing machines and pianos and its tremendous
use from the 1920's onward to cover installment sales of automo-
biles and all types of consumer goods created an entirely different
122 The usury statutes apply only to extensions of credit, that is, to cases in which
an obligor promises to pay money in the future in return for a present advance. How-
ever, the sale by a person to whom money is due of his right to receive the money for
a sum less than the amount due is not a transaction subject to the usury laws since the
seller himself does not promise to pay money in the future. Cases are collected in
Annot., 143 A.LR. 238 (1943).
123 See Britton & Ulrich, sapra note 121, at 140-44; Warren, supra note 121, at 857.
124 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1964). This statute is pat-
terned closely after the first English statute authorizing an interest charge. A Bill
Against Usury, 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545).
125 Professor Warren suggests that this may have been one of the reasons for the
early acceptance of the time-price doctrine. Warren, supra note 121, at 842.
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situation. 2 ' The purchaser of a new automobile may either
borrow money from a bank or finance company and pay cash for
the automobile or he may buy the automobile on credit from the
dealer. In either case the economic result is the same, especially in
view of the fact that in most cases the dealer who finances a sale
immediately transfers the paper to a bank or sales finance company
which, through a different office, would probably have loaned the
purchase price directly to the -buyer. In determining the "time-price"
the seller usually uses a chart furnished him by his financing agency
which shows the price which should be charged to produce the de-
sired yield. In such circumstances, to say that the additional charge
is not equivalent to an interest charge gets very farfetched indeed.
However, the doctrine continues; one court giving as an addi-
tional rationale for the rule the argument that "a purchaser is not
like the needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he
can refrain from the purchase if he does not choose to pay the price
asked by the seller."'2 7
In this area, as in others, it can be assumed that the courts
were "doing" better than they were "saying." So long as general
usury laws were the alternative to the time-price doctrine, the
time-price doctrine was the better choice. Holding that sales
were subject to general usury statutes would have forced sellers
into illegal transactions or into various subterfuges to avoid
their impact. And the small loan and installment loan laws which
ordinarily involved the concept of a licensed lender and substantial
State regulatory authority did not adequately fit the thousands of
retailers in the various States.
In spite of the fact that the time-price doctrine continued and
remains in effect presently, it is clear that there is no economic
difference between buying on credit and borrowing money to buy
with cash. The argument that a buyer on credit is not likely to be
victimized since he can refrain from the purchase if he does not
like the terms and that, therefore, there is a distinction between
sales credit and lender credit, does not stand dose analysis. Often,
purchases are as essential as any purposes for which money may be
borrowed. An automobile, a washing machine, and even a televi-
sion set can be considered necessities so that purchasing them on
credit should not be treated differently from a small loan. In
126 See Britton & Ulrich, supra note 121, at 140-44.
127 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 77-78, 262
S.W. 425, 428 (1924).
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earlier years, transportation, laundry, and entertainment services
may have been purchased from others at small daily and weekly
cost. Today, however, public facilities have withered as the
great bulk of these services are provided within the family unit.
The purchase of a washing machine or a television set will ordi-
narily provide laundry service and entertainment at a lower cost
than use of public facilities. In this context, the justifications for
regulation and control of consumer lenders would seem to apply
with equal force to consumer credit sellers."'
The need for regulation of installment sellers in a way similar
to the regulation of consumer lenders was recognized a good many
years ago; the first installment sales act took effect in Indiana in
1935.129 Today 43 States and the District of Columbia have retail
installment sales laws fixing the maximum finance charge which
may be imposed in credit sales. 30 These acts vary in coverage,
some covering only motor vehicles, some only goods other than
motor vehicles, and some which are so-called "all goods acts" cov-
ering sales of all kinds of goods. Some of the statutes are limited
to sales for nonbusiness purposes while others apply generally to
all credit sales.
The net effect of the evolution from the time-price doctrine
to regulation through retail installment sales acts is to subject
credit sales to regulation and rates very similar to those provided
under small loan and installment loan acts and to leave another
huge area of credit free from usury statute control.
(4) Exemptions for Loans to Corporations. -The time-price
doctrine and small loan, installment loan, industrial loan, and similar
laws take most nonreal estate consumer credit from under the gen-
eral usury statutes. The exemptions for loans to corporations ex-
clude from the usury laws loans at the other end of the lending
spectrum.
The first corporate exemption statute grew out of the use of the
usury statute by a New York bank to defeat what the business
community considered to be a just debt.
In 1838, the Dry Dock Bank of New York City suspended
123 See the similar arguments in Warren, supra note 121, at 841-43.
12 9 See Britton & Ulrich, supra note 121, at 151 n.59; 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT
GuIDE 5 35 (Aug. 17, 1966).
13 0 The States which have no statutes regulating finance charge rates in credit sales
are North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyom-
ing. 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUDE 35, at 1502-27, 1553-83 (Aug. 17, 1966).
In Arkansas, credit sales are subject to the general 10 percent usury law.
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payments and its property was placed in receivership. The direc-
tors thereupon arranged a fairly complicated note-shaving agree-
ment with the American Life Insurance and Trust Company to se-
cure financing to reopen the bank.131  In 1842, after the financing
agreement had put the bank on its feet, it sued to have its obliga-
tions to the trust company voided because the effective rate was
higher than the allowable New York statutory interest rate. The
New York court ruled in favor of Dry Dock.132
The business community was repelled by the decision, and at
the next legislative session a bill was passed forbidding corpora-
tions to plead the defense of usury.'
From this beginning, the exclusion of loans to corporations
spread until today 29 States and the District of Columbia allow
corporate borrowers to pay any rate agreed upon.' The basis
for the legislative exemptions would seem to be that corporations
do not need the protection of usury statutes. A corporate borrower
will nearly always be fully aware of the rate it is paying. It will,
13 1 The bank secured from the American Life Insurance and Trust Company two
certificates of deposit, each for £48,000 sterling, payable in London in installments
over the next 2 years. In return the bank gave the trust company its own bills of credit
for £50,000. The Dry Dock bills stipulated that they were payable in London in five
equal installments plus interest at 6 percent, but the bank collaterally agreed to pay
them in New York at $5 to the £, (about 13 cents per £ above the actual exchange rate)
and at 7 percent interest. In addition, the trust company vice-president was paid $2,500
and was sold 1,000 shares of bank stock at the depressed prerefinancing price. To get
immediate cash, the bank discounted the trust company certificates of deposit to other
New York bankers for about £42,000 each.
13 2 Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (Ct. App. 1850).
133 Act of 1850, ch. 172, § 1, 2, as amended, N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW 5
5-521 (McKinney Supp. 1967). An annotator of the Dry Dock case has said: "The in-
iquitous defense taken in this case led to the passage at the next session of the legislature
of the Act of 1850, ch. 172, forbidding corporations to interpose the defense of usury."
3 N.Y. at 345 (5th ed. 1888).
In Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 N.Y. 275, 276 (1861), the court referred to the Dry
Dock case as follows:
The celebrated case of The Dry Dock Bank v. The American Life and
Trust Company . .. is an instance of a corporation availing itself of the stat-
utes to prohibit usury, for the purpose of relieving itself from its contracts.
It had committed usury, and had derived a benefit therefrom, and then came
into a court of equity to punish its confrere in guilt by repossessing itself of
the property parted with, whilst retaining for its own benefit what it had re-
ceived from the opposite party. This court, in obedience to the positive man-
date of the statute, had to lend its aid to the perpetration of such gross injus-
tice. It is not surprizing that an act which produced such results should have
been stigmatized, by one of the learned and eminent judges of this court, as
"severely penal in its provisions," that, in fact, it was a barbarous act, un-
worthy of the age and country where it was found.
134 See Appendix A infra. New York, by a 1965 statute, gave corporations the
right to plead usury as a defense if the rate charged is 25 percent or more. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIGATIONS LAw 5 5-521(3) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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also, have looked carefully for the best possible terms and, if it
ends up paying a very high rate, it will almost always be because
its credit position does not justify a loan at a lower rate. Though
some corporations may ultimately fail because of a high interest
burden, others will survive on borrowed money which they could
not have secured at usury limit rates. On balance, it would seem
that in the corporate area it is better to let the parties make their
own bargains.
These 30 jurisdictions in which usury laws are not applicable
to corporations plus the two States in which there are no general
usury laws make a total of 32 jurisdictions in which corporations
may borrow free from any statutory limitation on interest rates.
In addition, nine other States fix maximum corporate borrower in-
terest rates which are higher than those fixed by the general usury
laws.3 5 There are only nine States" 6 (Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and
South Dakota) in which corporations are subject to the general
usury laws, and in only one of these States, South Dakota, is the gen-
eral usury limit lower than 10 percent. Of these nine States, Mon-
tana, Nevada, and South Dakota cannot be considered to be impor-
tant corporation States. Connecticut corporations, being geographi-
cally close to Massachusetts, can no doubt secure financing without
regard to usury limitation when needed, and, in California, banks are
not subject to usury laws, so there are some available suppliers for
loans at above usury rate."'
The corporate exception statutes fix differing qualifications for
the exemption. Many of them provide 'blanket corporate exemp-
tions, but in some States there are special limitations. In New
York, for example, the exemption does not apply to a corpo-
ration whose principal asset is a one- or two-family dwelling if it
was organized within 6 months prior to the execution of any notes
or security instruments issued in connection with the loan.' The
Washington statute makes a corporate borrower subject to the
usury law on obligations on which an individual is also liable. 9
1 3 5 See Appendix A infra.
130 Id.
137 However, given the conservative lending policies of banks, probably not a sub-
stantial amount of above 10 percent money is available from banks in California.
138N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1964). KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 360.025 (2) (1963), contains a similar provision.
139 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.030 (Supp. 1967); see Hershman, Usury and
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There has been a split of authority as to whether the exemption
statutes apply to a corporation organized specially for the purpose
of taking advantage of them. In New York it is permissible to
form a corporation for the express purpose of avoiding the usury
laws,140 and the same result has been reached in Maryland and
Illinois on an estoppel theory. 41
On the other hand, New Jersey has taken a very hard line,
holding that the defense of usury is available where a corporation
is formed in an attempt to avoid the usury statutes.142  In 1956,
the New Jersey Supreme Court suspended from practice for a year
a lawyer who had arranged an incorporation for the purpose of
avoiding the usury statute.4 Florida also has decisions inferring
that general usury statutes apply where the incorporation is for the
sole purpose of avoiding them.'44 Even in New York, there are
limits to the corporate exemption rule. In a case where the hus-
band and wife owners of a small incorporated retail hardware busi-
ness borrowed money through the corporation for the purpose of
making a down payment on a home they were purchasing, the court
held that the corporate exemption did not apply.4 5
The effect of the corporate usury exemption, in spite of the
cases holding that it cannot be used for the sole purpose of avoiding
the usury statutes and in spite of exclusions from the corporation
exceptions like those in New York and Washington, is to provide
a vehicle by which borrowers for a business purpose can escape
the Tight Money Market, 22 Bus. LAw. 333, 340 (1967) for a further listing of some
of the special State requirements for corporate usury exemptions.
140 Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930); Werger v. Haines Corp.,
94 N.Y.S.2d 691, affd per curiam, 277 App. Div. 1108, 101 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1950),
aff'd, 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951); see 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (1956).
141 Tidd v. LaSalle Indus. Fin. Corp., 326 Ill. App. 262, 61 N.E.2d 774 (1945);
Rabinowich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 152 A. 427 (1930). But cf. Engert v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill. App. 566, 82 N.E.2d 63 (1948) (mem.).
14 2 Gelber v. Kugal's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191,89 A.2d 654 (1952).
1431n re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956). The attorney failed to
advise the party incorporating that the reason for incorporation was avoidance of usury
statutes, and also failed to suggest that they might take $2,000 worth of marketable
securities given as collateral for the particular loan and borrow elsewhere at lower rates.
Therefore, it is not clear that the attorney would have been disciplined had the trans-
action been more straightforward.
144 Atlas Subsidiaries, Inc. v. 0. & A., Inc., 166 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1964). Florida
applies a 15 percent rate to corporations and the charge in question was above 25 per-
cent, therefore the Florida statutes were violated independently of the question of sham
incorporation. The court, however, referred to the sham nature of the transaction.
145 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconefsky, 37 Misc. 2d 745, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1962),
aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 593, 240 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1963) (mem.), afl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 676,
198 N.E.2d 907, 249 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1964) (mem.).
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the general usury laws. Incorporation may 'be inconvenient and
may increase the total cost of the loan, but the incorporation
method can be and is used to provide financing which would not
otherwise be available.
(5) Exemption of Banks and Savings and Loan Associations
or Savings Banks, -A number of States exempt banks and savings
and loan associations from usury laws. California,146 Connecti-
cut, 47 Colorado, 48 and Delaware exempt banks, although Dela-
ware exempts banks only as to loans above $5,000 for which nego-
tiable instruments, negotiable documents of tide, or investment
securities are given as collateral. 4 A larger group of States, includ-
ing California, 5 ' Colorado,' Connecticut,' Florida, 53 Illinois ,1
4
Louisiana, 5  Minnesota,' 6  Ohio,' 57  South Dakota,' West
Virginia, "9 and probably some others,160 exempt savings and loan
associations.
The reason for the exclusion presumably is that these are public
investment institutions under governmental supervision and under
a fiduciary duty to depositors which makes it very unlikely that any
rate which they might charge would be unreasonable.
(6) Other Exemptions. -In addition to the various exemptions
covered above, there are a variety of miscellaneous exemptions or
special higher rates which may be found scattered through the
States. Illinois and Maine, for example, impose no statutory max-
imum on any business loan, nor on loans of $5,000 or more secured
14o CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22.
147 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-9 (1958).
14 8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-10 (1963).
249 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 2302 (1953).
160 CAL. CONST. art 20, § 22.
151 COLO. REv, STAT. ANN. 5 73-2-10 (1963).
152 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 36-178(e) (1958).
153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.18 (1966); see Spinney v. Winter Park Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 120 Fla. 453, 162 So. 899 (1935).
1 54 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 800 (Smith-Hurd 1967).
155 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:728 (1950).
lr)6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334-06 (1966).
157 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1151.21 (Page 1954).
158 S.D. CODE § 7.0414 (1939).
159 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-17 (Supp. 1967).
160 Research in the State statutes in this area is difficult because of the different
places in which exemptions from the usury laws are placed and the failure of index
systems to index some of the provisions under interest or usury. On savings and loan
associations and the usury laws, see Prather, Savings Association Mortgages and the
Usury Laws, 1960 UNiTED STATES SAV. & LOAN LEAGUE LEGAL BULL. 125.
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by warehouse receipts, or negotiable instruments or securities. 6 '
Connecticut exempts loans of $5,000 or more secured by "bona
fide" mortgages of real property.162 Some States exempt Federal
Housing Authority (FHA) insured home improvement loans.6
and about 30 States exempt FHA-insured home mortgage loans.'
There are, no doubt, other exemptions scattered through the statute
books of the 50 States and the District of Columbia which could be
forced to the surface by a skindiver willing to spend weeks poking
about in the murky waters of the State laws.
C. Percentage of Total Private Debt Subject to Usury Laws
The existence of the various exemptions from the usury laws
just discussed makes it clear that a substantial portion of outstanding
private debt in the United States is not subject to the general usury
laws. Particularly, nearly all nonreal estate secured consumer debt
is either subject to special interest rates much higher than the usury
rate or is not subject to rate control at all under the time-price doc-
161 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1967) reads in pertinent part:
It is lawful to charge, contract for, and receive any rate or amount of in-
terest or other compensation with respect to the following transactions:
(a) Any loan made to a corporation;
(b) Advances of money, repayable on demand, to an amount not less
than $5,000, which are made upon warehouse receipts, bills of lading, cer-
tificates of stock, certificates of deposit, bills of exchange, bonds or other
negotiable instruments pledged as collateral security for such repayment, if
evidenced by a writing;
(c) Any business loan to a business association or copartnership or to a
person owning and operating a business as sole proprietor or to any persons
owning and operating a business as joint venturers, or to any limited part-
nership, or to any trustee owning and operating a business or whose benefi-
ciaries own and operate a business, transacted solely for the purpose of carry-
ing on or acquiring the business of such business association, copartnership,
joint venture, limited parmership, trustee, beneficiaries, or persons; except
that any loan which is secured (1) by an assignment of an individual ob-
ligor's salary, wages, commissions or other compensation for services, or (2)
by his household furniture or other goods used for his personal, family or
household purposes shall be deemed not to be a business loan; and provided
further that a loan which otherwise qualifies as a business loan shall not be
deemed a non-business loan by the inclusion, with other security, of real estate
occupied by an individual obligor solely as his residence.
See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 229 (Supp. 1967).
162 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 37-9 (1958).
163 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(d) (Smith-Hurd 1967).
164 Hershman, supra note 139, at 341, lists the following States as having excluded
FHA-insured loans from State usury statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, In-
diana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia.
THE USURY HEADACHE
trine. Further, most corporate debt is not subject to any statutory
maximum rate.
Unfortunately, debt figures by appropriate classification are not
available on a State-by-State basis and it is impossible to make an
exact determination as to the amount of outstanding debt which is
subject to usury statutes. However, the Federal Reserve Board
does report total debt figures on a national basis. Using the Fed-
eral Reserve figures plus the information set out above concerning
State usury laws and the exemptions, a rough approximation as to
the percentage of national private debt which is subject to general
usury laws can be made. This approximation, while it is not much
more than an educated guess, will be sufficiently accurate to allow
the drawing of some conclusions concerning the actual effect of
usury laws on the money market.
As of December 31, 1966, the last period for which the Fed-
eral Reserve Board had reported full figures as of the time this was
written, the total debt in the United States, excluding federal, State,
and local governmental obligations, was $659.1 billion.16
This debt breaks down roughly as follows:166
Consumer debt 67  $ 94.7 billion
Household real estate mortgages' 68  $224.1 billion
(1-to 4-family dwellings)
Commercial real estate mortgages' 69  $ 99.9 billion
Corporate bonds'70  $108.0 billion
Bank farm credit 171 $ 8.5 billion
Farm mortgage debt17 2  $ 23.3 billion
Bank commercial loans' 73  $ 80.5 billion
Other loans' 74  $ 20.1 billion
Of that debt, it may be assumed that practically all of the con-
165 FED, RESERVE BULL., Feb. 1968, at A-65.12, Table 6. These figures do nor
include corporate stock or financial system (for example, banks and savings and loan
associations) borrowing.
106 AU figures in the following breakdown were taken from FED. REsERV E BULL.,
Feb. 1968. However, the various charts from which the amounts are taken sometimes
show minor percentage differences. For example, id. at A-44 shows the 1- to 4-family
dwelling debt as $224.1 billion while id, at A-65.12 shows it as $222.8 billion. Such
differences are not significant for our purposes and no attempt has been made to deter-




170 Id. at A-65.12, Table 6.
1711d. at A-22.
1721d. at A-44.
173 Id. at A-22.
174 All the other items were subtracted from the total private debt to get this figure.
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sumer debt of $94.7 billion was not subject to general usury laws
because of the time-price doctrine and the small loan, industrial
loan, installment loan laws, and retail installment sales laws. Some
part of the debt, primarily single payment loans,1 5 and Arkansas
transactions, is subject to usury statutes. As a conservative estimate
it is assumed that 80 percent or $75.8 billion of the 1966 consumer
debt was not subject to usury statutes.
Because of the corporate exemptions from usury statutes and
the bank exemptions in California, Connecticut, Colorado, and Del-
aware, it is estimated that a major part of the commercial real estate
debt, corporate bond debt, and bank commercial loan debt, is not
subject to usury statutes. Of this total of $288.4 billion, it is as-
sumed that 90 percent of the bond debt of $108 billion was not
subject to the general usury laws, that 80 percent of the total bank
commercial loan volume of $80.5 billion was not subject to usury
laws, and that 66.6 percent of the commercial mortgage debt of
$99.9 billion was not subject to usury laws. The 80 percent esti-
mate for bank commercial loans and the 66.6 percent estimate for
commercial real estate loans reflect an attempt to take into consider-
ation loans to unincorporated businesses, a method of operation
which is particularly prevalent in commercial real estate financing.
On this basis, $228 billion of the total business debt of $288.4 bil-
lion would not have been subject to usury laws.
Of the $224.1 billion in one- to four-family dwelling mort-
gages outstanding on December 31, 1966, $64.8 billion..6 was
held by life insurance companies. These mortgages would appar-
ently have been subject to usury statutes in all States except the two
States without usury laws and Connecticut. If we deduct 5 percent
as the estimated total for loans made in those States, $61.6 billion
of these loans were subject to usury statutes. At that time, commer-
cial banks held $34.8 billion 77 in household real estate mortgages,
and by assuming that 10 percent of this amount was in those States
without usury laws or where banks are not subject to usury statutes,
$31.3 billion of this debt is left subject to usury statutes. As of De-
175 Installment loan exemptions to the usury statutes, by definition, do not apply to
single payment loans. Single payment loans might fall under some other exception to
the general usury laws such as small loan laws or credit union laws, but, so that any error
in the estimate made will be in favor of usury statute coverage, it is assumed that all
single payment consumer credit was subject to usury statutes. As of Dec. 31, 1966, $7.8
billion of single payment consumer credit was outstanding. FED. RESERVE BuLL., Feb.
1968, at A-48.
3-76 ld. at A-45.
177 Id. at A-44.
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cember 31, 1966, savings and loan associations and savings banks
held $114.4 billion178 of home mortgage debt. In at least 11 States,
savings and loan associations are not subject to usury statutes.
Assuming that 25 percent of savings and loan loans were made in
those States and the no-usury States, $85.8 billion of savings and
loan and savings bank home mortgage debt was subject to usury
statutes. Therefore, a total of $188.7 billion of residual real estate
debt as of December 31, 1966 was, on the above estimates, subject
to general usury laws and $35.4 billion was not.
Of the total farm real estate and bank credit of $31.8 billion as
of December 31, 1966, it is assumed that roughly 90 percent was
subject to usury statutes. The other 10 percent is attributed to
(a) those States which have no usury statutes, (b) those States
which exempt banks and savings and loan associations from usury
laws, and (c) loans to farmers under installment loan laws. On
this assumption about $28.8 billion of 1966 farm real estate and
bank credit was subject to usury statutes and about $3 billion was
not. For the purposes of our discussion it will be assumed that all
of the $20 billion of "other loans" shown in the total debt break-
down was subject to usury statutes.
On the above estimates something like $343 billion, more than
half of the total 1966 debt of $659.1 billion, was not subject to
usury statutes. Even though the calculations are subject to substan-
tial error, it is believed that the error is toward including too much
of the debt within usury statute regulation and that actually at least
60 percent of private debt is not subject to usury statute control.
An unpublished study made for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also supports the conclu-
sion that most private debt in the United States is not subject to gen-
eral usury statutes."79 That study, which covers 15 States considered
to be representative, attempts to establish on a State-by-State basis
the proportions of various kinds of debt subject to usury statutes.
The study is an approximation only, depending on such sources of
information as the number of under-$20,000 real estate mortgage
filings in each State, the percentage of national income received by
the citizens of the State, the percentage of national farm income
1781do at A-45.
79 H. Bailey, Analysis of Existing Debt in the United States and State by State on
Basis of Existing Laws Affecting Interest Rates and Finance Charges (unpublished
1966) (copy on file in University of Illinois, College of Law library). (That study and
its conclusions reflected the views and conclusions of its author and not necessarily the
views and conclusions of the National Conference of Commissioners.)
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reserved by the farmers in each State, and a survey of the State
usury and interest laws.180 In spite of the necessary approxima-
tions, the study is sufficiently accurate to serve our purposes.
The study estimates that in California, which exempts savings and
loan associations and banks from the general usury statutes and
provides special rates for industrial loan companies, credit unions,
pawnbrokers, personal property brokers, and some nonprofit co-
operatives,' 8 ' only 38 percent of all private debt is subject to the gen-
eral usury statutes. The author estimates that approximately 2 percent
of household mortgage and consumer debt is subject to the general
usury statutes, as is approximately 80 percent of farm credit, and
66 percent of business credit.'82
In Colorado, which exempts banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, and title and guarantee company loans over $1,500 from the
usury laws, and provides special rates for small loans, retail install-
ment sales, industrial banks, credit unions, and pawnbrokers,' the
study estimates that 45 percent of all private lending is subject to
usury statutes. It is estimated that approximately 25 percent of
household mortgage and consumer credit is subject to usury statutes,
as is 68 percent of business credit, and 33 percent of farm credit."8
Florida exempts from the general usury statutes sales of bonds,
money loaned on the security of bonds, and loans by building and
loan associations or pawnbrokers. There are special rates for
small loans, retail installment sales, corporate borrowers, bank in-
stallment loans of $5,000 or less, and loans by credit unions and
individual savings banks.'85 The study estimates that 35 percent
of total private debt in Florida is subject to the general usury stat-
utes and that 53 percent of household mortgage and consumer debt
is subject to the general usury statutes, as is 20 percent of business
debt and 25 percent of farm debt.'86
In Indiana, which exempts corporate borrowers from the gen-
eral usury law and provides special rates for small loans, install-
ment loans, industrial loan and investment companies, credit unions,
pawnbrokers, and, to a limited extent, savings and loan associa-
180 For a discussion of the methods used, see id. at General 1 and 2.
181 Id. at California 4.
182 See Appendix B, chart 1 infra.
183 H. Bailey, supra note 179, at Colorado 3.
18 4 See Appendix B, chart 2 infra.
18 H. Bailey, supra note 179, at Florida 3.
1 8 6 See Appendix B, chart 4 infra.
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tions and banks, 87 it is estimated that 45 percent of all private debt
is subject to the usury law. It is estimated that 76 percent of house-
hold mortgage and consumer credit, 18 percent of business credit,
and 83 percent of farm credit is subject to the usury law.'88
New York exempts from the general usury laws any demand
loan of $5,000 or more secured by a security, document of title, or
negotiable instrument and also exempts loans to corporate bor-
rowers. It provides special rates for small loans, retail installment
sales, bank and trust company loans, and loans by industrial banks,
credit unions, and pawnbrokers.8 9 It is estimated that 23 per-
cent of New York loans are subject to the general usury statute, and
that 56 percent of household and consumer credit is subject to usury
laws, as is all of farm credit and approximately 12 percent of busi-
ness credit.180
The reader will not be further encumbered with State-by-State
detail, but following are estimates as to the total percentage of
private debt which is subject to the general usury statutes in the 10
other States surveyed (charts for all these States are included in
Appendix B) : Connecticut, 41 percent; Georgia, 33 percent; Indiana,
45 percent; Iowa, 47 percent; Michigan, 44 percent; Minnesota,
34 percent; New Jersey, 39 percent; New Mexico, 36 percent;
Ohio, 51 percent; Pennsylvania, 24 percent.
In summary, of the 15 States studied, it is estimated that in only
one, Ohio, is 50 percent or more of the total volume of private debt
in the State subject to general usury statutes. Also, it is dear from
the study, as it is from the statutory material surveyed earlier, that
by far the greatest impact of usury statutes is in the area of home
real estate mortgages and farm finance. Other than in these two
areas, usury statutes have no substantial impact in States with a
corporate exemption, nor is there substantial interference with cor-
porate finance in those States which instead have a high usury ceil-
ing or a special high ceiling for corporate borrowers. Legislators,
though so far unwilling to completely repeal usury laws, have
filled the statute books with exemptions which have taken care of
many of the situations in which usury laws interfered with lending
operations.
18 TH. Bailey, supra note 179, at Indiana 2-3.
L88 See Appendix B, chart 7 infra.
189 H. Bailey, supra note 179, at New York 4-5.
'
90 See appendix B, chart 13 infra.
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D. Some Significant Effects of Usury Laws
The sections which follow discuss the effect of the present usury
statutes upon (1) home mortgage finance, (2) farm lending, and
(3) business loans.
(1) Home Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws. -Home
mortgage loans constitute, by far, the largest single lending area
covered by general usury laws and make up a substantial portion
of all debt subject to the general usury statutes of the various States.
Of the $232.1 billion of one- to four-family home mortgage debt
outstanding in the third quarter of 1967,' a substantial propor-
tion, perhaps as much as $200 billion, is subject to general usury
laws.
It is submitted that the usury laws in this area do more harm
than good. The fear that without usury ceilings mortgage interest
rates would go higher and higher is not justified by the facts. In-
terest rates on home mortgages are responsive to general money
market levels and do not go to usury ceiling rates unless the gen-
eral market interest rates approach the usury ceiling. The chart in
the footnote"' which sets out interest rates for 18 metropolitan areas
191 FED. RESERVE BULL., Feb. 1968, at A-44.
19 2 INTEREST RATES OF CONVENTIONAL FIRST MORTGAGE LOANS
ORIGINATED ON SINGLE - FAMILY HOMES BY MAJOR TYPES
OF LENDERS
NEW HOMES*
Contract Interest Rate (Percent) Month of December
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Atlanta 5.87% 5.64% 5.92% 6.86% 6.92%
Baltimore 5.61 5.54 5.54 6.00 6.00
Boston 5.25 5.28 5.24 6.22 6.36
Chicago 5.64 5.42 5.47 6.38 6.31
Cleveland 5.83 5.74 5.76 6.52 6.26
Dallas 5.90 5.77 5.87 6.82 6.72
Denver 6.05 5.78 6.04 6.65 6.58
Detroit 5.55 5.53 5.53 6.43 6.50
Houston 5.87 6.19 6.10 6.96 6.57
Los Angeles-
Long Beach 6.05 6.12 6.07 6.50 6.58
Memphis 5.73 5.87 5.73 6.64 6.76
Miami 5.87 5.80 5.97 6.36 6.45
Minneapolis-
St. Paul 5.52 5.63 5.68 6.77 6.75
New Orleans 5.75 5.67 5.91 6.63 6.98
New York 5.83 5.76 5.72 5.98 6.00
Philadelphia 5.52 5.47 5.54 6.01 6.05
San Francisco-
Oakland 5.95 5.86 5.89 6.85 6.71
Seattle 5.79 5.77 5.81 6.94 6.85
UNITED STATES 5.80% 5.76% 5.78% 6.44% 6.45%
* Based on data from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board-Office of Public
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as of December for the years 1963 through 1967 is very instructive
in this regard. In 1963, the rates ranged from a low of 5.25 per-
cent in Boston to a high of 6.05 percent in Los Angeles-Long Beach.
Neither of these areas has or had a usury statute which had any ef-
fect on these rates. Massachusetts has no usury law at all and Cali-
fornia exempts banks and savings and loan associations from its 10
percent general usury limit. Boston is, however, in a capital sur-
plus area while Los Angeles is in a capital shortage area. Boston,
in a State which has had no usury limitation for 100 years, also had
the lowest home mortgage interest rates in the years 1964 and 1965.
As general interest rates rose in 1966 and 1967 and 6 percent usury
laws began to bite, the reported rates in New York, Baltimore, and
Philadelphia, all in 6 percent States, fell below those of the Boston
area. If this were all there is to the story, usury laws would be vin-
dicated, for the conclusion would be that they do operate to hold
down interest rates when they should operate, that is when rates are
rising. However, that is not the whole story.
The home mortgage market is not insulated from other money
markets and markets in 6 percent States are not insulated from the
markets in States with 8, 9, 10, or 12 percent usury rates. When,
in New York, for example, the general interest rate reaches such a
level that general commercial and business loans are being made at
above 6 percent and bond yields are above 6 percent,'93 it would
seem obvious that one of two things is going to happen. Either
methods of evading the usury laws are going to be found or a sub-
stantial amount of money will be diverted from the local home
mortgage market to other, more profitable areas. As a matter of
fact, both things happen.
The practice of taking discounts or "points" is presently being
used in New York to avoid the 6 percent ceilings.'94 The point
system operates in the following way. A builder or seller prices his
Affairs (Chart supplied by Office of the General Counsel, United States Sav-
ings & Loan League.)
103 The highest prime interest rates reported in this century were in 1920 when
the average interest rate for that year on 4- to 6-month commercial paper was 7.5 per-
cent. S. HoMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 364 (1963). The highest rates
presently for prime money range around 6.5 percent. See text accompanying notes 40-
43 supra. However, some first mortgage home loan rates presently are above 7 percent.
See NATIONAL OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
'
9 4 "A 'point' is 1 percent of the original principal amount of the mortgage debt,
to be paid in cash to the lender. The term of the debt is irrelevant. A $40,000 mort-
gage with two points means that the borrower (or seller) pays the lender $800 in cash
at the inception of the transaction." Felsenfeld, Consumer Rates, A Public Learning
Process, 23 Bus. LAw. footnote 9 (forthcoming fall 1968). N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1967, at 71, col. 1, reported the point operations in New York.
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house at, say, $25,000. A buyer appears who is willing to pay
$25,000 if he can secure a loan of $18,000. The lender, however,
says he will make a loan of $18,000 at the usury limit of 6 percent
only if the seller pays him $1,800, which the seller does. The effect
of this transaction is that the lender is repaid $18,000 plus interest
at 6 percent, even though he has actually loaned only $16,200. The
$1,800 discount or 10-point deduction from the stated loan of
$18,000 is, in reality, additional yield or interest payment to the
lender. If the above loan is payable over a 20-year period, the
actual yield received by the lender will be approximately 7.3 percent
simple annual interest. The point or discount system also imposes
heavy penalties on the borrower if the loan is paid off early. In
that case the effective interest may rise sharply. For example, if the
loan is paid off in 8 years the effective yield is increased to approxi-
mately 9 percent and if the loan is repaid in 3 years the interest rate
raises to approximately 13.2 percent.'"
It might be argued that when the seller pays the points (and
therefore takes less for his house than his stated price), the bor-
rower is not really affected by the points. But, the usual result of
the existence of a point system is that the seller increases the price
of his house so that he can absorb the discount. The writer has not
been able to find any cases dealing with the question of whether
the discounts violate usury statutes. The fact is they do result in
additional yield to the lender and should be treated as additional
interest."' 6 In spite of the fact that the legality of points is ques-
1 9 5 The net effect on the interest rate of the stated discount was computed by taking
the total monthly amount necessary to pay off an amortized loan of $18,000 over peri-
ods of 20, 8, and 3 years and then computing this cost per $1,000 on a loan of $16,200
for the same period of time. The cost per $1,000 was then translated into interest cost.
196 It has been pointed out by a recent writer on the subject that if the seller of a
house takes a mortgage and note back himself at the highest stated interest rate and
immediately transfers the note and mortgage to a lender at a price less than the face
amount of the mortgage, no usury would be involved. Hershman, Usury and the Tight
Money Market, 22 Bus. IAw. 333 (1967). While this is true (see the discussion text
accompanying note 122 supra) it does not necessarily follow that the same result should
be reached where the mortgage runs directly to the bank or finance company.
The New York Commissioner of Banks was quoted in the New York Times as
saying: "the point is neither higher interest rates nor lower interest rates, but a realistic
flexibility...." N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1967, at 71, col. 1.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, in the case of commercial sellers of houses,
would treat the difference between the cash price of the house and the total time price
as interest. If, for example, a developer regularly sold house model B-5 in his subdi-
vision at $35,400 for cash and in a particular transaction extended the credit himself
at a price of $37,000 at interest of 6 percent, the $1,600 difference between the cash
price and the credit price would be treated as additional interest. UNIFORM CON-
SUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2-109,-10 (Tent Draft No. 8, 1968).
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tionable, they are taken because otherwise the lender could get
higher returns elsewhere.
There are at least two reasons for objecting to the point or
discount system. First, since the points paid are not dependent
on the length of the loan and since no part of them is refunded
when the loan is prepaid, they work rather high penalties for pre-
payment. Second, they often result in misleading a buyer. Even
if the buyer knows of the discount he may not understand its effect
on the rate. However, far more serious is the fact that the home
buyer will often not know that the seller is paying a discount to the
lender. If the buyer knew the amount of discount and the effect
on the rate, he might prefer to arrange a loan from a different
lender, or use other assets of his own in the purchase, or, perhaps,
forego the purchase until credit is available on better terms.1"6a
Even though the point system is widely used to get around
usury statutes, the ability of prospective home buyers to secure loans
is substantially reduced when market rates go above usury ceilings.
Many lenders are reluctant to lend at high discounts because of a
feared adverse effect on their public image and because of doubt
as to the legality of the discount system." r The New York Times,
on March 7, 1968, reported that the Bowery Savings Bank of New
York City, with assets of $2.9 billion (more than 1 percent of total
national one- to four-family dwelling mortgage credit), would lend
only to persons who had been depositors for a year or more.' The
Times reported that the Bowery Bank thus fell in line with other
New York City savings banks which had been following the same
policy for some time. It also reported that in 1967 New York sav-
ings banks only invested $916 million within New York while in-
vesting $1,100 million outside the State where allowable returns
were higher. While this writer does not have similar figures for
other States with low usury ceilings, it is more than reasonable to
assume that such States find themselves in a similar situation. That
this is so is evidenced by the fact that in Pennsylvania, a 6 percent
1Oaa The recently enacted Consumer Credit Protection Act would require the dis-
closure of the effect on the rate of the payment of points. Consumer Credit Protection
Act (as passed by Congress, May 22, 1968). The text of the act may be found in CCH
INsTALLMENT CREDIT GuimE (2d extra ed., No. 177, May 24, 1968). Therefore, this
particular objection to the point or discount system should lose its force. The prepay-
ment penalty aspects of the point system, however, remain.
107 Hearings on Mortgage Credit Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86
(1967).
108 N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1968, at 61, col. 4.
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State, an attempt is being made to raise the home mortgage usury
rate from 6 percent to 7 percent via a 1 percent "premium" which
may be charged in addition to the general usury rate. 9 '
It appears that the home mortgage market suffers first and
hardest when money becomes tight. In the 1966 tight money mar-
ket, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts declined
from 1,735,000 in April to 819,000 in October."0 Of course, not
all the drop in housing starts can be attributed to usury laws. Even
in States with usury rates which were high enough to be out of the
way of the market rates, housing starts dropped.2' Other factors
such as the hesitancy of borrowers to pay high interest rates and
the preference of lenders for alternative investments were also in-
volved."' In addition, the 1966 drop was partly caused by a sub-
stantial outflow of funds from savings and loan associations be-
cause of a large differential between interest rates which savings
and loans were allowed to pay and the rates which banks were al-
lowed to pay on certificates of deposit." 3 However, as already
pointed out, low usury ceilings do result in a substantial reduction
of the flow of money into the home mortgage market.0 4
In this regard, the experience of the federal government with
restrictions on interest rates for Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans' Administration (VA) insured loans is worthy
of careful consideration. After World War II, FHA -maximum
rates were first set at 4V2 percent and VA maximum rates at 4 per-
cent. However, the 1950's and 1960's were periods of rising in-
terest rates and by steps, usually percent at a time, the maximum
interest rates were raised and finally reached 6 percent in October
1966.2"' However, the maximum rates were not increased fast
enough to keep pace with the general increase in interest rates and
steep discounts developed many times, sometimes going as high as
10 percent of the loan.206 Twice, in 1950 and in 1957, Congress
199 Pa. Senate Bill 1239 (1967) as amended.
2 0 0 
DEPARTMENT OF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 90TH CONG. IST
SEss., REPORT ON MORTGAGE DIscoUNTs 13 (Comm. Print 1967).
201 Hearings, supra note 197, at 218.
202 Id. at 18.
203 Hearings on S. 3687, S. 3527, S. 3529 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
204 See also the testimony of Undersecretary Barr of the Treasury Department, in
Hearings, supra note 197, at 49.
2 05 Id. at 41, Table C.
2 0 6
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 200, at
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attempted to enforce the federal FHA and VA "usury laws" by
controlling discounts and each time the provisions were repealed.
Each time it appeared that they had the effect of driving prospec-
tive lenders from the market and, therefore, of depriving mortgage
funds to the marginal borrower."' From the repeal in 1958 until
20 7 Following is a part of the Senate report made in 1957 in connection with the
repeal of the last discount control legislation:
DISCOUNT CONTROLS
In response to very forceful presentations by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and the Veterans' Administration, section 6 of the bill would re-
peal certain provisions of law which require detailed regulation of discounts
charged by lenders to increase the yield of FIHIA-insured and VA-guaranteed
loans. The statement made by the Commissioner of the Federal Housing
Administration reads, in part, as follows:
"* HA has made every effort to administer the provisions of this
section in a manner that would cause as little disruption of the normal prac-
tices of the homebuilding and financing industries as possible, while at the
same time preventing any excessive charges to home buyers. In spite of
these efforts this provision has created confusion and reluctance on the part
of lenders toward using FHA-insured financing. This is working a hardship
against prospective home buyers, particularly in the lower priced housing
area where higher loan-value-ratio mortgages are most needed.
' These controls should be repealed for the following reasons also:
"1. They tend to increase costs for mortgage money because the per-
mitted maximum discount becomes the standard charge for the best transac-
tions.
"2. Discount controls actually have the effect of excluding from FHA
programs those categories of borrowers who are most in need and whom the
controls are intended to aid - low-income families, minority group families,
and residents of small towns.
"3. It is not administratively feasible to establish variations in permis-
sible discounts for all of the factors which are believed by secondary market
buyers to constitute justification for variations in discounts. Furthermore, ef-
fective understanding and enforcement by both FI-A and industry requires
that discount controls be simplified to a maximum extent. Under these con-
ditions, all scarcities of mortgage money for specific situations tend to be
ascribed to the inadequacies of discount controls and the administration of
such controls is made still more difficult
"4. Costs of enforcing such controls are great and are unavoidable if
industry's respect for FlHA regulations is to be maintained.
"5. Aggregate funds for FllA-insured mortgages tend to be less under
discount controls. These controls unnecessarily complicate the operations of
the mortgage lending industry and as such many lenders will favor alterna-
tive investments rather than attempting to operate under such control regula-
tions. Also, funds which would otherwise be allocated to marginal cases
because of the higher yields on cases with greater than average discounts,
will seek other areas of investment
"We believe these controls, in reality, penalize those they are supposed
to benefit 0 * *."
Without endorsing specifically any of the Commissioner's views, the com-
mittee believes that existing law on this subject is not accomplishing the de-
sired objectives. Consequently, this bill would repeal section 605 of the
Housing Act of 1957. The committee will continue its study of this prob-
lem, however, in the hope that some more workable solution may be found.
Quoted in id. at 33.
The discount legislation presented special problems because of the complexity of
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1968, the FHA and VA administrators accepted the fact that dis-
counts would occur whenever a discount was necessary to bring the
yield on FHA and VA loans up to general money market yields.08
However, when in late 1967 discounts again went as high as
10 percent of the loan, a substantial belief developed that the 6
percent ceiling itself should be removed so that the point system
would not be forced upon lenders. On March 26, 1968, the House
of Representatives approved legislation which would allow the
Veterans' Administration to fix rates above 6 percent when neces-
sary to attract funds"' 9  This legislation, now before the Senate,
would finally solve the discount problem as to VA loans.
To summarize, usury statutes in the home mortgage field have
no effect until general interest rates reach a level near the usury
rates; then their effect is to (1) drive lenders to more or less decep-
tive ways of avoiding the usury limitations, and (2) drive money
out of the home mortgage market.
In the context of the present legal situation which provides
prospective lenders with a very large market not subject to usury
statute control, a major policy issue which should be considered in
deciding whether usury statutes should be repealed or rate limits
raised substantially, is whether the home mortgage market should be
the first and most seriously affected area of the economy in times of
tight money and higher interest rates. This does not seem to have
ever been the conscious policy of either the States or the federal
government, and it does not seem a justified policy. Why a con-
sumer should be able to borrow money to buy a new automobile,
but should not be able to borrow money to buy a new house, is not
apparent to anyone except, perhaps, the automobile industry.
Of course, repealing the existing usury laws does leave the pos-
sibility that there will be an occasional loan by a noninstitutional
lender at a rate which is much too high in relationship to the risk
taken. This problem can be alleviated, however, by a maximum
rate statute which fixes rates high enough above general market
rates that it never has the effect of driving down the general hous-
ing market.
(2) Farm Credit. -Farm credit is another area presently sub-
the administration control required. However, its basic effect was the same as that of
State usury laws, i.e., reduction of the market when general market rates reach the
statutory ceiling.
208Hearings, supra note 197, at 13, 31, 37.
209H.R. 10,477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1968, at 3,
col. 4.
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stantially subject to usury controls and, therefore, any general argu-
ment in behalf of repeal of usury laws must be concerned with the
possible effects of repeal on farm credit. Total farm credit on Jan-
uary 1, 1967, was approximately $45.7 billion of which $21.2
billion was nonreal estate secured debt.210 In 1965, the average in-
terest rate on farm mortgages, a large portion of which are subject
to usury laws, varied from a high of 5.98 percent in Georgia to a
low of 5.37 percent in Iowa.211 In spite of the fact that in many of
the great farming States usury statutes fix rates substantially higher
than 6 percent, all States reported averages below 6 percent.
While there are apparently no accurate reported figures on the
actual rates charged farmers for nonreal estate secured credit, there
are some special features of farm nonreal estate finance which are
significant in considering the effect of usury laws.
There are three major sources of short term farm credit: com-
mercial banks, production credit associations (PCA), and merchants
and dealers. Commercial banks provide about one-half of farm
credit and on January 1, 1967, had approximately $8.5 billion in
short term farm loans outstanding.21" ' Production credit associations,
farmer-owned cooperatives chartered under federal laws and oper-
ating in all areas of the United States, had loans of $3 billion out-
standing on January 1, 1967.212 While there are no accurate total
figures available it seems likely that merchant and dealer credit to
farmers is around $3 billion.21 Another government agency, the
Farmer's Home Administration, also makes farm loans, but its total
volume is insignificant in relation to the other sources of credit. 14
Also, the Farmer's Home Administration is restricted by law to
lending to those who cannot borrow from commercial lenders at
210 Evans & Warren, Farm Credit apd Tight Money io 1966-67, AGICUJLTURAL
FINANCE REv., Nov. 1967, at 4.
2 11 Eitel, Characteristics of Farm Mortgages Recorded, First Quarter, 1965, AGRI-
CULTURAL FINANcE REV., Nov. 1967, at 39.
211a FED. RESERVE BULL, Apr. 1968, at A-22.
2 12 Evans& Warren, supra note 210, at 5. W. MURRAY & A. NELSON, AGRIcuL-
TtJAL FINANCE 390-403 (1960), contains a general discussion of production credit
associations. See also AGRICULTURAL FINAN E REV., Nov. 1967, at 84-85.
2 1 3 1n 1966, seven large farm machinery manufacturers alone held nearly three-
quarters of a billion dollars of debt arising out of purchases from their dealers of farm
equipment purchase contracts. Hamlin & Eitel, Manufarturer Financing of Farm Ma-
chinery Sales to Farmers, 1963-1966, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE REV., Nov. 1967, at
52.
214 Total Farmer's Home Administration loans as of Jan. 1, 1967 were about three-
quarters of a billion dollars. Evans & Warren, supra note 210, at 5.
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reasonable rates (apparently the PCA rate is considered to be the
relevant reasonable rate). 215
Perhaps the most significant factor in the farm credit picture is
the large percentage of farm credit which is handled by the produc-
tion credit associations. The PCA's borrow from Federal Inter-
mediate Credit banks at rates fixed by the general money market
and loan at rates which are sufficient to cover the cost of money
plus the administrative costs of the PCA." 6 Rates on April 1,
1967, were between 7 and 8 percent for 68 percent of the associa-
tions."' The strength of the PCA's in the farm lending market is
such that commercial banks, the major source of farm operating
credit, generally find it necessary to lend at rates close to PCA rates.
Rates for merchant credit probably run around 12 percent." 8 It
appears, then, that the credit worthy farmer has available credit at
reasonable prices. The fact, also, that farmer cooperatives find it
necessary to charge rates between 7 and 8 percent suggests that in
the present market 6 and 7 percent usury statutes are unrealistic.
Further, in nearly all States, if the particular farmer's credit
position is such that he is a high risk, loans may be made to him
under installment loan or even small loan legislation which pro-
vides returns substantially higher than those allowed by the usury
statutes. This suggests that the farmer who cannot compete in the
marketplace for money at reasonable rates should perhaps be
treated as a consumer or small businessman in regard to rate lim-
itations. This, as will be seen later, is the way he would be treated
under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
(3) Business Loans and Usury Statutes. -While the corpo-
rate, bank, and installment loan exemptions to the usury statutes
detailed above remove much of the sting from, and pressure upon,
usury laws in relationship to business loans, cases still occur, even
in States which are most liberal in rates and exemptions, involving
loans which are in areas subject to usury laws but in which the risk
factor is so great that loans cannot reasonably be made within the
statutory limit. An excellent example of this kind of case, and of a
fairly frequent judicial response to it, is found in Martyn v. Leslie,"9
215 W. MURRAY & A. NELSON, supra note 212, at 439-58, discusses the Farmer's
Home Administration.
21O See id. at 390-403.
217 Eighteen percent of the PCA's were charging 6 percent and under, 7 percent were
charging between 6 and 7 percent, and another 7 percent were charging rates above 8
percent. Evans & Warren, supra note 210, at 9.
218W. MURRAY & A. NELSON, supra note 212, at 311-15.
219 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58 (1955).
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a 1955 California decision. Plaintiffs were partners engaged in the
production of a television series of 39 weekly episodes. Plaintiffs
produced three episodes under their original financing. At this
point, however, they needed additional financing and borrowed
enough money from various sources to produce three more episodes.
But again, after producing six episodes, they were unable to proceed
without additional money. It seemed at this point that they were
not going to be able to secure the necessary funds and would
lose their entire investment because the six episodes, by themselves,
would not be saleable.
However, the partnership was saved by an arrangement with
the defendants for a loan of $36,000 for 6 months. Under the
arrangement, the plaintiffs signed a note for $35,500 payable with
interest at 5 percent. The other $500, which made up the total of
$36,000, was stated to be the purchase price of a 15 percent inter-
est in the partnership which was being sold to the defendants. The
partners were given an option to repurchase their 15 percent inter-
est at a price of $8,000 within 6 months. Under the agreement,
certain guarantors of the loan agreed to purchase the 15 percent
interest from defendants -for $8,000 if the plaintiffs failed to exer-
cise their option.22 After the debt had been paid and the "option"
to repurchase the 15 percent interest exercised, the plaintiffs at-
tacked the transaction as usurious,"' claiming that the $7,500 prof-
it earned by the defendants on the sale-compulsory repurchase
agreement was additional interest. If the $7,500 profit were treated
as interest, the total interest charge was $8,387.50 or a simple an-
nual interest rate of approximately 47 percent.
The defendants argued that the transaction involved a bona
fide purchase-resale agreement and gave two basic supporting argu-
ments: (1) the transaction was set up in this way so that they could
receive capital gains tax treatment as to the $7,500, and (2) the
arrangement was offered to them by the plaintiffs as an induce-
ment to enter into the transaction. These arguments amounted to
assertions that there was a nonusury reason for the arrangement
and that, in any event, the borrowers, not the lenders, proposed it.
In spite of the fact that the sale-repurchase agreement is a
220 A second transaction with a different group of defendants was later entered into
on similar terms, but is omitted from the discussion here.
22 1 The California maximum rate applying to the transaction was 10 percent. See
Appendix A infra.
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well-known, long-used device for evasion of usury laws," 2 the trial
court found that there was no violation of the usury statutes and
the decision was affirmed by the appellate court.22
The appellate court justified its affirmation of the trial court
by saying that the partnership did not bind itself to repurchase
the 15 percent interest and there was no evidence that the partner-
ship agreed to reimburse the guarantors who did bind themselves to
purchase it. This arrangement, said the court, was not usurious
since securing a return greater than that allowed by the usury statutes
through payments from third parties is not a violation. This ration-
ale would allow any lender to avoid the usury statutes by arranging
for payments through two parties. It is hard to believe that such an
evasion technique would be sanctioned except in a case like Martyn
where it is dear that the risk involved justified the high rate
charged.
Another California case in which the court found no violation
of usury laws even though a violation seemed obvious on any rea-
sonable analysis, is Lindsey v. Campbell.2" Wheeler, a real estate
developer and partner of Lindsey, asked Mrs. Campbell, a widow,
if she were interested in receiving $14,000 in return for supplying
$6,400 to the partnership for 1 year. She agreed to the proposition
and was given seven notes for $2,000 each. After all were paid,
the plaintiffs instituted suit for refunds and statutory damages claim-
ing that the transaction was usurious. The trial court found for the
plaintiffs, but was reversed on appeal. The appellate court stated,
inter alia (in spite of the fact that there was nothing contingent
about the widow's repayment right): "We do not see how the trial
court could have inferred from the facts stated that any of the parties
to the transaction understood that it involved a loan of money."22 5
The court thought it was clear that, instead of being a loan, the
transaction was an "investment."
On reflection, the case could be written off either as incredibly
bad analysis of a transaction or as an extension of the rule in the
Daisy Whiffle v. Twitter Bird Seed Company case.226  All loans
222 Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
54, 65 (1941).
223 The California Supreme Court refused to hear a further appeal. Martyn v.
Leslie, 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58, 62 (1955).
224 132 Cal. App. 2d 746, 282 P.2d 948 (1955).
225 Id. at 751, 282 P.2d at 952.
226 The rule in Twitter is adequately summed up in the following instruction which
was given to the jury: "If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was a woman
and the defendant was a corporation, your verdict will naturally be for the lady." As
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at interest are "investments" and a loan at a high rate may be a very
good (or very bad) investment, but nevertheless, both a loan and an
investment. The essential requirements of a loan would seem to be
the giving of the present use of money, or money's worth, in ex-
change for a promise to return money, or money's worth, at a
later time.2 ' This was the situation in Lindsey and the court's
assertion otherwise does not change the realities. However, the
case should be treated as one which recognizes the inexact, bludg-
eon nature of usury laws and refused to apply them where the
total circumstances and risk taken justified the rate paid.
Obviously, if usury statutes are as easy to avoid as these two
cases indicate, they have little, if any, effect. Yet, as long as usury
laws remain on the statute books, cases like Martyn must be con-
sidered to involve very doubtful statutory interpretation. Such
cases, however, have one outstanding virtue. They recognize, sub
silentio, that the risk of nonpayment is often so great that a loan at
very high rates is not unreasonable. If such decisions could be
expected in cases in which, on the facts, they are called for, usury
laws would be subject to much less criticism. But, of course, such
judicial tailoring of concepts under the traditional usury laws can-
not be depended upon. In a 1954 California case, the operative
facts were essentially the same as in the Lindsey case, except that a
husband and wife, rather than a widow, were involved. A con-
struction company promised to pay $10,000 in return for a loan of
$5,000 for 1 year. The agreement provided for an irrevocable
assignment to the lenders of a certain amount from the sales price of
each house completed, but also included a guarantee of the corpora-
tion's principal shareholder that the full $10,000, evidenced by a
note, would be paid. The appellate court reversed a lower court
holding that the transaction was a joint adventure contract and held
it a usurious loan. 2
The cases just reviewed alert one to the fact that courts some-
times try very hard to escape the impact of usury laws. There are
reported by Robert T. Sloan, Daisy Whiffle v. Twitter Bird Seed Company, in THE JU-
DICIAL HuMoRuST 20, 24 (W. Prosser ed. 1952).
227 In fact in an earlier case in which a court had found usury, the California Su-
preme Court had said: "A loan... is the delivery of a sum of money to another under
a contract to return at some future rime an equivalent amount with or without an ad-
ditional sum agreed upon for its use .... " Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d
335, 339, 163 P.2d 869, 871 (1945).
228Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 425, 269 P.2d 132 (1954). In
Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 746, 41 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1964), the
parties tried to take advantage of the Lindsey v. Campbell rules by calling the return a
guaranteed profit and the total agreement an "investment" but they failed.
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several fairly standard methods used to either conceal the nature of
the transaction or the true rate being paid and which have fared
reasonably well at the hands of courts, a few of which will now be
discussed.
The first is the sale with recourse of conditional sales contracts
or customer accounts. There are two basic ways of setting up the
transaction by which a seller of goods or services gets present cash
for his customer time-payment accounts. They are, respectively,
"recourse" and "nonrecourse" assignment of the accounts. In both
transactions the finance company or bank advances cash for the
assigned accounts. In a nonrecourse financing arrangement, the
assignee bank or finance company thereafter takes the risk that the
account will not be paid and the transferor of the accounts usually
has nothing further to do with them. While this transaction gen-
erates present money in place of future money, it is usually con-
sidered a sale not a loan, and properly so, since the transferor of
the accounts is under no obligation to repay any part of the price
paid for the accounts. The assignee in the nonrecourse transaction
has simply purchased the right to payment in the future at a dis-
count sufficient to cover the costs of the money he has paid for the
accounts, the risk that some part of the accounts will not be paid,
and a profit.
In recourse financing of accounts, on the other hand, the trans-
feror of the accounts promises that if any of the accounts trans-
ferred are not paid when due he will pay them. This transaction
is the equivalent of a loan. If the debt is not paid from the pro-
ceeds of the accounts, the transferor must pay any deficiency, just
as in any case of deficiency after recovery on collateral given for a
loan. Similarly, the transferee of accounts on a recourse basis is
taking only the risk, which every secured lender takes, that the
borrower will not be able to pay the debt and that the security
will not cover the amount which is to be repaid.22 a
As just pointed out, recourse financing is indistinguishable from
a loan. However, lenders often attempt to avoid usury laws which
would be applicable to loans by calling the recourse transaction a
sale. And courts have often seized on very flimsy facts (sometimes
2 2 8a There are business justifications for the use of either recourse or nonrecourse
financing. In nonrecourse financing, the transferor gets rid of the uncertainties of col-
lection. Recourse financing, on the other hand, will provide lower costs of "borrowing"
(or a higher "sales price") since the transferee of the account is not taking the risk of
nonpayment by the account debtors.
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nothing more than that the parties called the transaction a sale) to
find that the recourse transaction is a sale.
In a 1967 Texas case,229 a finance company made an arrange-
ment with a dealer under which the finance company was to pur-
chase the dealer's sales contracts with full recourse (under the terms
of the agreement the dealer had to take back any sales contract
which became 90 days delinquent and pay the finance company
the amount outstanding). The court affirmed a jury verdict finding
a sale.
Against the borrower-seller's contention that the court should
have, as a matter of law, found a loan, the appellate court cited as
supporting the jury verdict the following factors: (1) the borrower
had requested that the lender "purchase" automobile paper rather
than make a loan; (2) the parties called the transaction a purchase;
(3) the borrower's board of directors authorized assignment of ac-
counts without indicating that they were assigned as collateral only;
(4) the lender showed the transactions on its books as a pur-
chase.2 29a In the course of its opinion, the court distinguished sev-
eral prior Texas cases which had reached the contrary result on simi-
lar facts." °  All the factors relied upon by the court amount to
nothing more than that the parties called the transaction a sale.
However, calling the transaction a sale does not always work.
In Milana v. Credit Discount Co.,23 the parties entered into a "sales
agreement" under which the defendant would "buy" plaintiff's ac-
counts at a 2 percent discount (later raised to 2 percent). The
agreement contained an unconditional guarantee by plaintiff that
all accounts would be paid within 60 days after the assignment.
Plaintiff's suit attacking the transaction under the usury statutes was
dismissed, she appealed, and the California Supreme Court re-
versed. The court noted that usury statutes cannot be avoided by
mere word forms and said:
The significant fact is that if the defendants had really purchased
229 A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
accord, B. & D., Inc. v. E-Z Acceptance Corp., 186 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1966); Cobb v. Bax-
ter, 292 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1956); Starker v. Heckart, 200 Ore. 573, 267 P.2d 219 (1954);
see Annot, 165 A.L.R. 626 (1946).
220a The issue framed for the jury was: "'Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the transactions between the plaintiff ... and the defendant..., which
are listed on plaintiff's Exhibit 'A', were loans of money by the defendant to the plain-
tiff?'" The jury answered in the negative. 421 S.W.2d at 726. There is no discussion
of the charge under which the jury returned its verdict.
230 421 S.W.2d at 727-28, 730-31.
23127 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945).
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the accounts and had taken absolute title there would be no oc-
casion for the provision or practice relating to guaranties of pay-
ment within specified dates, or reversions of title and "re-pur-
chase," in the event of delayed payment by the customer.232
There are other cases reaching a similar result. 33
Financing a business on the basis of its accounts receivable is a
fairly expensive form of financing234 because of the many individual
transactions included and also because it is likely to be used by a
business which has exhausted all other credit avenues; so that ac-
counts receivable financing is comparatively high risk financing.
Therefore, in States with low usury ceilings there is substantial rea-
son to attempt to avoid the usury statutes by casting the transaction
as a sale. And this is done (with varying success) as shown by the
cases just discussed.
A common banking practice used to secure a return higher than
that allowed by usury statutes is the requirement of "compensating
balances." In a typical example, reported in a recent Louisiana
case," 5 the defendant borrowed $235,000 from the plaintiff bank.
However, the bank required the defendant to leave $28,000 of the
total in a deposit in the bank on which the bank paid no interest.
Defendant paid interest at 7 percent on the total $235,000, though
he actually had the use of only $207,000. The interest paid, if
applied only to the money the defendant actually had the use of,
would have made the interest rate 7.9 percent. The court, how-
ever, held that since the $28,000 would finally be applied to the
payment of the debt, the actual interest rate was the stated 7 per-
cent.
23 6
232 Id. at 342, 163 P.2d at 872.
2 3 3 E.g., Sedberry v. Duffy, 158 N.C. 432, 73 S.E. 355 (1912); see Annot., 165
A.L.R. 626 (1946). See the earlier Texas cases cited in A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv.
Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). Many of the cases involve very compli-
cated business arrangements which are difficult to categorize. Agreements, for example,
may provide that the "buyer" of the accounts will also render other services such as ad-
vice on collection techniques or credit approvals. In such a case, even though there is
full recourse, the discount in excess of the usury rate may be considered to be payment
for additional services. Agreements may also split the risk of customer nonpayment
between the "seller" and the "buyer" of the accounts. These limited recourse agreements
are also difficult to categorize as loans or sales. For a case involving both types of addi-
tional agreements, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 66
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1933).
234 It is reported that interest rates on accounts receivable financing average 9 to 15
percent and occasionally go as high as 18 to 20 percent. . PHELPS, ACCOUNTS RE-
CEIVABLE FINANCING AS A METHOD OF SEcuRING BUSINESS LOANS 52 (2d ed.
1961).
235 Deposit Guar. Nael Bank v. Shipp, 205 So. 2d 101 (L.a. 1967).
236 Id. The defendant argued that the withheld amounts increased the interest rate
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The devices discussed above are but a small fraction of the
many methods which have been tried as a means of avoiding usury
laws. Among other schemes which have been used are (1) the
tie-in sale, a sale of goods at a very high price as a condition to
making the loan; (2) the sale of credit, which requires two lender
parties, one to make the loan at the highest legal rate and the other
to guarantee the loan for an additional payment from the borrower;
and (3) making the loan payable only upon the nonoccurrence of
a contingency like the total destruction of Manhattan Island (this
has sometimes been considered to make payments above the usury
statute nonusurious because they are merely compensation for the
increased risk).257
III. A CuRE FOR THE USURY HEADACHE
Before taking a look at the provisions of the proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code which, it has already been suggested, contains
a cure for the usury headache, a quick review of the present usury
situation is in order. First, present usury statutes have almost no
operation in the nonreal estate consumer credit area because of the
time-price doctrine and the many special statutes which provide
innumerable special rates and special exceptions to the general usury
statutes. Second, many States have so reduced the penalties for
usury that lenders can afford to ignore the statute."'5 Third, usury
statutes have only a limited and somewhat haphazard effect on busi-
ness transactions because of the many corporate exemptions. How-
ever, the unincorporated business borrower or the corporate borrower
in the few States without the exemption often may find that the
usury statute stands in -the way of obtaining needed capital. The
cases reviewed above indicate some of the many devices used to
avoid usury statutes and also indicate that such devices are some-
times successful and sometimes not. Fourth, because of the exemp-
tions just described and other exemptions referred to earlier, more
to 17 percent, which was, of course, an absurd argument. As a matter of fact, the
louisiana usury rate is 8 percent, so the particular loan would not have violated the
statute in any event. The court, however, apparently did not make the computations
from which this would have been discovered.
2 37 See Collins, supra note 222, at 55; Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer
Credit Code, 16 U. Cm. L Ri. 609 (1949); Note, California's Model Approach to
Usury, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1966); Comment, Usury - Effectiveness of the
General Usury Statutes of Missouri, 26 Mo. L REv. 217 (1961).
238 Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53
VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (1967). Revolving charge plans with interest rates of about 1
percent per month are good examples of a current business practice which may violate
usury statutes in many States.
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than half of the volume of private debt in the country is not sub-
ject to usury statutes. The availability of alternative sources of
investment not subject to usury laws results in a substantial flow
of funds away from regulated areas whenever the free market rate
goes above the particular statutory maximum rate. Fifth, the lend-
ing areas in which usury statutes presently have substantial impact
are home mortgage and farm finance. In the home mortgage area,
usury statutes which set rates low enough to affect actual market
interest rates also have the effect of driving lenders to the use of sub-
terfuges to avoid the statutory ceilings or of driving them from the
home mortgage market, or both. Mortgage interest rate figures
indicate conclusively that it is the general money market, not the
statutory ceilings, which fix home mortgage interest rates. The
same situation seems to prevail as to farm finance; and in farm
finance the situation is also affected by the substantial portion of
farm lending which is done by farmer-owned production credit
associations.
It could be argued that the solution to the unregulated competi-
tion problem and the flow of money away from the home mortgage
area is complete regulation of the money market by comprehensive
usury statutes. Such an attempt, however, would be wrong as a
matter of policy, and if history is any guide, almost certain to fail
as a matter of fact. Legislatures should not make a bludgeon decision
that only business which can qualify for 6 percent credit or 10 per-
cent credit can get financing. While States should, no doubt,
place controls on consumer credit, this is not presently done by
usury statutes, but rather by the many exceptions to them. More
important, money market interest rates in this country presently are
manipulated as a matter of national policy by federal agencies, par-
ticularly by the components of the Federal Reserve System. This
manipulation can and does operate rather effectively to control up
and down swings in the national economy.239 The State legislatures,
without the information or flexibility, and without the responsibility
and power to control national money trends, should withdraw from
attempts to fix money market rates.
Further, as a matter of fact, it has been true historically that
ways to avoid usury statutes have been found, where necessary to
meet market conditions, and this will almost certainly continue to
239 For a good brief discussion of recent federal action affecting interest rates, see
Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight Money Market,
27 MD. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1967). See also W. MURRAY & A. NELSON, supra note 212,
at 295-307.
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happen so long as usury statutes exist. The conclusion to which this
writer is inescapably drawn is that usury statutes which attempt to
fix the market price for money are wrong in principle and are essen-
tially unworkable. This does not mean, however, that no statutory
limits are feasible. On the contrary, statutory limits can be adopted
which set the outside limits on conscionable transactions. Such
limits, however, should attempt to prevent only those transactions
which would almost never be justified by the risk or expense in-
volved. It would seem, for example, that a limit of 10 or 12 per-
cent simple annual interest is too low. Too many actual transac-
tions take place in this range; too many of which are justified by
the cost and expense involved.
Of course, any limit fixed by statute is likely to exclude some
transactions which are justified on the basis of expense and risk.
The job of the legislature is to choose a rate high enough that it
does not interfere with the bona fide credit market but low enough
to give substantial protection to the unknowing or hard-pressed
debtor. Furthermore, the judgment already made by a number of
States that no statutory interest rate limit should be placed on sub-
stantial business transactions seems to be justified and should be a
part of any statutory scheme regulating interest rates.
A. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code"'0 would restructure and
simplify the total statutory framework concerning lending and sell-
ing on credit. In place of the many present statutory and time-price
rules in existence in the various States it would substitute an orderly,
uniform system. It establishes three categories for interest rate
regulation purposes: (1) consumer and agricultural purpose loans
and credit sales of not more than $25,000 (the $25,000 limitation
does not apply to loans secured by real estate); (2) business purpose
credit sales and loans of not more than $25,000 to individuals
240 All references herein are to Working Draft No. 8, May 1968, which has been
published in CCH INSTAlLMmNT CREIT GUmE (extra ed. No. 176, 1968). Present
plans are that the Consumer Code will be approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners in the summer of 1968 and proposed for adoption by the various States. See
the following articles dealing with the Consumer Code: Johnson, Regulation of Finance
Charges on Consumer Credit, 66 MicH. L. REv. 81 (1967); Jordan & Warren, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLU.L L REV. 387 (1968); Jordan & Warren,
A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 441
(1967); Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MIcH L.
REv. 1285 (1966); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented View-
point, 68 CoLUM. L. Rie. 445 (1968); Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Cana-
dian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLuM. L. REv. 488 (1968).
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or, in a very limited situation, to organizations; and (3) other
(business) loans.24' While the Consumer Code contains separate
articles on sales and on loans the maximum interest rates are the
same in both articles, except for revolving credit balances under
$500 where the sale credit rates are somewhat higher.242  The basic
maximum rate fixed for consumer, agricultural purpose, and small
business loans or credit sales is 18 percent simple annual interest
with higher rates for portions of the debt under $1,000. The small
debt rates are 36 percent on that part of the debt which is $300
or less, 21 percent on that part which is more than $300 but not
more than $1,000, and 15 percent on that part of the debt above
$1,000.243
The Consumer Code defines a consumer credit sale as a sale of
goods, services, or land by a professional seller to an individual who
is buying primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural
purpose.244 A consumer loan is a loan made by a professional lender
241 In addition to its provisions relating to interest rates, the Consumer Code also
fixes disclosure and advertising requirements for consumer and agricultural purpose
loans, limits creditor remedies in consumer and agricultural transactions, and provides
for administrative control of higher rate lenders. These aspects of the Consumer Code
are beyond the scope of this article, though they should be kept in mind when consid-
ering its rate structure.
242 The Consumer Code terms for "interest" are in article 2 on credit sales: "credit
service charge"; UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2-109 [hereinafter cited as
C.C.C.], and in article 3 on loans, "loan finance charge." Id. § 3-109. Under the
Consumer Code, the time-price doctrine is replaced by statutory rate limitations on
allowable credit service charge. However, the Consumer Code goes to some lengths to
preserve the distinction between time-price differential and interest charges. Credit
sales and loans are treated in separate articles and the terminology which is used to define
the permissible charges for credit is different. All this is done, without creating a sub-
stantive difference in allowed rates, for the purpose of preserving the distinction between
time-price differential and interest. It is believed that the reason for preserving the dis-
tinction is political. Merchant groups want the extra insurance against the possibility of
being subjected to general usury laws, and the National Conference is willing to make
a concession on a formal point which has no substantive effect on the Consumer Code
since actual rates allowed, except for revolving charge balances under $500, are the same
in both credit sales and in loans.
243 C.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-602, 3-201, 3-508, 3-602. The rates for revolving credit loans
are 1 Y2 percent per month; credit sellers may charge 2 percent per month on that part of
the balance below $500. id. §§ 2-207, 3-201. The combination of 36, 21, and 15 per-
cent rates evens out at 18 percent at around $2,500 and at this point the regular 18 per-
cent ceiling comes into operation.
244 Id. § 2-104. [Definition: "Consumer Credit Sale".]
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), "consumer credit sale" is a
sale of goods, services, or an interest in land in which
(a) credit is granted by a seller who regularly engages as a seller
in credit transactions of the same kind,
(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization,
(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily
for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
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to an individual who borrows primarily for a personal, family, house-
hold, or agricultural purpose."4 5 Loans and credit sales by non-
professionals are subject to the 18 percent maximum.
(d) either the debt is payable in instalments or a credit service
charge is made, and,
(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed
does not exceed $25,000.
(2) "Consumer credit sale" does not include
(a) a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods
or services pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement, or
(b) a sale of an interest in land if the credit service charge, how-
ever calculated, does not exceed 10 per cent per year calculated on the
unpaid balances of the amount financed according to the United States
rule; for the purpose of calculating the rate of the credit service charge,
non-periodic charges made at the inception of the sale which are included
in the credit service charge shall be amortized over the term of the sale
agreement notwithstanding that the debt is paid prior to the end of the
agreed term, and charges for the privilege of prepaying the debt shall
not be included in the credit service charge.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pur-
suant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amount (section 1.106).
The 10 percent rate limitation as a device for exempting real estate secured consumer
and farm loans from the Consumer Code substantive provisions may be dropped in view
of the passage of the "Federal Truth in Lending Bill" which does subject all consumer
real estate mortgages to some of the disclosure provisions of that Act. Consumer Pro-
tection Act, (as passed by Congress, May 22, 1968), §§ 106, 128, 129, which can be
found in CCH INSTALLmsNT CREDIT GUIDE (2d extra ed., No. 177, May 24, 1968).
Under the Federal Act, the Federal Reserve Board may exempt transactions in particular
States if it finds that the State has disclosure provisions which are substantially the same
as the federal requirements. Id. § 123.
245 Id. § 3-104. [Definition: "Consumer Loan".]
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), "consumer loan" is a loan
made by a person regularly engaged in the business of making loans in which
(a) the debtor is a person other than an organization;
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, house-
hold, or agricultural purpose;
(c) either the debt is payable in instalments or a loan finance
charge is made; and
(d) either the principal does not exceed $25,000 or the debt is
secured by an interest in land.
(2) "Consumer loan" does not include a loan which is secured primarily
by
(a) business collateral, if at the time the loan is made the value
of this collateral is substantial in relation to the amount of the loan; or
(b) an interest in land, if at the time the loan is made the value
of this collateral is substantial in relation to the amount of the loan, and
the loan finance charge, however calculated, does not exceed 10 per cent
per year calculated on the unpaid balances of the principal according to
the United States rule; for the purpose of calculating the rate of the loan
finance charge, non-periodic charges made at the inception of the loan
which are included in the loan finance charge shall be amortized over
the agreed term of the loan, notwithstanding that the loan is paid prior
to the agreed maturity, and charges for the privilege of prepaying the
loan shall not be included in the loan finance charge.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pur-
suant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amount (Section 1.106).
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The Consumer Code provisions exclude 10-percent-and-under
real estate sales and loans from the definition of consumer credit 246
with the effect of excluding such transactions (which will include
practically all ordinary first mortgages) from the Consumer Code
provisions as to disclosure, remedies, and special administrative con-
trols which apply to lenders. Of course, if a real estate secured loan
is made at an interest rate of more than 10 percent, it is treated in
the same manner as any other consumer sale or loan and is subject
to the 18 percent ceiling.
(1) Nonreal Estate Consumer Loans and the Consumer Code.
-Practically all nonreal estate consumer lending and credit selling
is made at an interest rate of more than 10 percent, it is treated in
is not covered by general usury laws. Earlier the development of
the time-price doctrine, and the small loan, instalment loan, and
other special laws which take consumer transactions out from under
the usury laws was discussed. Since the primary concern of this
article is the general usury laws themselves, the rates adopted by
the Consumer Code in the consumer area will not be dealt with in
substantial detail. It is worth noting, however, that the Consumer
Code would replace the present multitude of State statutes with a
single statute which applies the same statutory maximums to all
consumer transactions.
The Consumer Code maximum rates are, as just pointed out, a
high of 36 percent simple annual interest in transactions under
$300, and a low of 18 percent in portions of the debt above $2,500.
The rates fixed by the Consumer Code fall at about the midpoint
of existing rate limitations in the small loan area and are above most
present installment loan rates in the area over $3,000. As has been
noted by several writers;247 the policy which the legislature deter-
mines in fixing a small loan or installment loan rate is how restricted
or broad should buyer or borrower access to the credit market be.
The lower the statutory maximum, the less risks the lender is able
to take and the more difficult it is for poorer credit risks to obtain
loans. Several studies have indicated that when maximum small
loan rates are raised, the volume of loans made increases but the rates
of profit of small loan lenders remain the same.2 48 This means that
under higher rate statutes lenders expand their market by mak-
ing loans to poorer risks so that loan losses and increased costs of
246 See notes 244-45 supra.
247 Johnson, supra note 240; see J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER F-
NANCE INDUSTRY 55-86 (1967).
248 J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, supra note 247, at 55-86.
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lending, on a percentage basis, offset the increased revenue from the
higher rate. This also indicates, as is the fact, that present small
loan licensees usually lend at the maximum rate. However, other
lenders, such as banks, industrial banks, and installment loan lenders,
make loans at lower rates when the amount borrowed and the bor-
rower's credit rating justifies lower rates.
The legislature in fixing a maximum interest rate for consumer
transactions decides what rate is too high to pay, even for borrowers
who cannot otherwise obtain credit. In the case of consumption
credit this seems to be a desirable and even necessary legislative
judgment. A family which cannot borrow except at rates of, say,
60 or 70 percent perhaps should not be permitted to borrow. This
may mean that the family will have to forego physical comforts
which other families have or even that it will become a public
charge when it might have tided itself over a difficult period with
a high rate loan. However, it is better that a family becomes a
temporary public charge than that it become involved in a loan
which saps the earning power of its wage earners for months or
years.
It should be noted, in considering Consumer Code consumer
rates, that the Consumer Code requires all lenders and credit sellers
to disclose their finance charges as a simple annual interest rate and
allows free entry into the lending business. The disclosure provi-
sions which make it easy for the borrower or buyer to compare
credit rates and the free entry provisions which should give prac-
tically every borrower or buyer access to a number of credit suppliers
should result in strong competition in the credit market. The care-
ful shopper, therefore, if he is credit worthy, should be able to
borrow at below the ceilings. However, ceilings are preserved to
protect the careless shopper and to set an outside limit on the credit
unworthiness of borrowers who can secure credit.
(2) Consumer Real Estate Loans and the Consumer Code.
The Consumer Code 18 percent maximum interest rate also applies
to home mortgage loans. 4' This maximum is intended to set the
outside limit for conscionable transactions, but is not otherwise in-
tended to affect the free operation of the real estate mortgage
market. This writer believes that the Consumer Code scheme is
the proper way of dealing with real estate mortgage rate limitations.
It has already been pointed out that mortgage rates are responsive to
general money market conditions and stay near the prime interest
2 49 See notes 240-45 sfupra & accompanying text.
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rate even where there are no statutory ceilings.25° It has also been
pointed out that, when market interest rates reach or go above the
general usury rates applicable to real estate transactions, lenders
either use subterfuges to secure the return justified by market condi-
tions or they withdraw from the mortgage market.25'
Statutory ceilings which attempt to hold down the general
market interest rate are, therefore, self-defeating, and the only
statutory maximums which are justified are those which attempt
solely to reach the occasional individual unconscionably high rate.
This is what the 18 percent limitation does. There are a substantial
number of real estate secured transactions with rates of from 9 to 13
percent and a rate any lower than 18 percent would unnecessarily
interfere with many routine financing situations. FHA insured
home improvement loans, for example, yield 9 to 10 percent, and
nonFHA insured home improvement loans are made at rates rang-
ing from 8 to 13 percent.252 It may be objected that an ordinary
first mortgage at 14 percent would be unconscionable. But whether
that would be so as to any particular loan depends upon the credit
worthiness of the borrower, the size and repayment terms of the
loan, and the ratio of the loan to security. The 18 percent rate is
a compromise figure which may be too low, and which will itself
no doubt force some legitimate loans out of the market. On the
other hand, under developing unconscionabiity concepts, even in-
terest rates under 18 percent may be struck down or reduced by a
court as unconscionable if the rate is not, as a matter of fact, reason-
ably justified on the facts.2"3 Taking all these factors into considera-
tion, the 18 percent ceiling seems a reasonable one.
(3) Agricultural Credit and the Consumer Code. -The Con-
sumer Code treats agricultural credit as consumer credit.2 There-
250 See notes 191-209 supra & accompanying text.
251 See notes 194-209 supra & accompanying text.
252 See Jung, Terms on Home Improvement Loans, 2 NAT'L BANKING REV. 51
(1964).
253 See the following recent cases in which excessively high price of goods was a
substantial element in a finding of unconscionability: Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52
Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967); American Improvement Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435,
201 A.2d 886 (1964). The Consumer Code, section 5-107(3) states that: "For the pur-
pose of this section [court may refuse to enforce or limit recovery on unconscionable
agreements] a charge or practice expressly permitted by this Act is not of itself uncon-
scionable." This writer takes the "not of itself" language to suggest that, taken together
with other aspects of the transaction, a charge, even though authorized by the Consumer
Code, may be unconscionable.
254 See note 244 supra.
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fore, farm real estate mortgage debt is treated in the same way as
consumer real estate mortgage debt and nonreal estate secured farm
debt is treated in the same way as is equivalent consumer debt.
There is, therefore, an 18 percent maximum rate with higher maxi-
mums for transactions of $2,500 or less.255 The special features of
the farm credit market have already been pointed out, particularly
the effect of production credit associations and of the installment
loan safety valve for farmers who do not qualify for lower rates.258
These factors, plus the matters discussed elsewhere in this article on
the Consumer Code and consumer credit257 indicate that this treat-
ment of farm credit is justified. Here again, the purpose of the 18
percent limitation is to set an outside limit within which market
forces can operate.
(4) Small Indiv'idual Business Loans and the Consumer Code,
-The Consumer Code drafters were convinced that large busi-
ness operations should be able to borrow at whatever rates they can
negotiate free of arbitrary statutory restrictions. It makes no sense
to impose limits on what General Motors, or more pertinently,
American Motors, may pay for credit. On the other hand, the very
small ,businessman is really in many respects indistinguishable from
the consumer. The typical small small businessman, for instance
the operator of a corner grocery store, is likely to be no more able
than the typical consumer to negotiate carefully for credit terms,
and high interest charges on a 'business loan to him is likely to have
the same effect which a high rate loan has on a consumer. There-
fore, a distinction between types of businesses is made by the Con-
sumer Code which, while it preserves part of the corporate exemp-
tion idea, is somewhat more sophisticated. The Consumer Code
establishes a category of small business credit transactions (those
under $25,000) which is subject to an 18 percent rate ceiling 'but
which is not subject to the special disclosure and limitation of
remedy rules which apply to consumer transactions. This category
includes loans or credit sales for nonconsumer purposes to individ-
uals or to an organization if the loan is secured primarily by a one-
or two-family dwelling occupied by a person related to the organiza-
tion.2 8 However, the parties may by contract provide that the loan
2 55 See notes 240-43 supra & accompanying text.
2Z6 See text accompanying notes 210-18 supra.
2 57 See text accompanying notes 247-54 supra.
258 CC.C. § 2-602. [Credit Service Charge for Other Certain Sales.]
(1) This section applies to a sale of goods, services, or an interest in land
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shall be treated as a consumer transaction, in which event the higher
rates for under $1,000 amounts apply as do all the limitation of
remedy and disclosure provisions applicable to consumer transac-
tions.2 59
(5) Other Loans and the Consumer Code. -The Consumer
Code provides outside rate protection for smaller individual busi-
ness borrowers under the provisions just discussed, but, similar to the
law already in effect in a few States,260 it imposes no statutory ceiling
at all on business loans or credit sales of amounts of more than
$25,000.261 Also, there is no statutory ceiling rate on any loan or
credit sale to a corporation, except for the "incorporated house"
situation noted above.
In the business debt area, the only difference between the Con-
sumer Code rules and the present law of the many States which
exempt corporations from the usury laws is that noncorporate busi-
ness borrowers of amounts above $25,000 may also deal free of rate
regulation. As the cases reviewed above show, there are noncorpo-
rate business situations in which rigid statutory ceilings are unrealistic.
The legislature cannot determine, in advance, rates which are proper
which is not subject to the provisions of this Act applying to consumer credit
sales and in which the amount financed does not exceed $25,000 if
(a) the buyer is a person other than an organization; or
(b) the debt is secured primarily by a security interest in a one or
two family dwelling occupied by a person related to the debtor.
(2) With respect to a sale to which this section applies, other than a sale
pursuant to a revolving charge account, the parties may contract for the pay-
ment by the buyer of an amount comprising the amount financed and a credit
service charge not in excess of 18 percent per year calculated on the unpaid
balances of the amount financed according to the United States rule.
(3) With respect to a sale to which this section applies made pursuant
to a revolving charge account, the parties may contract for the payment of a
credit service charge not in excess of that permitted by the provisions on credit
service charge for revolving charge accounts (Section 2.207).
(4) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pur-
suant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (Section 1.106).
Id. § 3-602 has identical provisions as to loans.
2591 d. § 2-601. "[Sales Subject to Act by Agreement of Parties.] The parties to a
sale other than a consumer credit sale may agree in a writing signed by the parties that
the sale is subject to the provisions of this Act applying to consumer credit sales. If the
parties so agree the sale is a consumer credit sale for the purposes of this Act." Id. §
3-601 contains identical provisions as to loans.
260 Illinois and Maine exempt all business loans from the general usury statutes.
See text accompanying note 161 supra. Massachusetts and New Hampshire do not have
usury statutes.
261 C.C.C. § 2-605. "[Credit Service Charge for Other Sales.) With respect to a
sale other than a consumer credit sale or a sale for which credit service charge ceilings
are set by the provisions on credit service charge for certain other sales (Section 2.602),
the parties may contract for the payment by the buyer of any credit service charge agreed
to in writing."
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for a particular transaction and there does not seem to be any reason
why business borrowers should not be able to go into the market and
pay whatever is necessary to obtain money. Here, the Consamer
Code continues the judgment presently made by most States that
major business deals should not ,be limited by an arbitrary statute
interest rate, even 18 percent. Of course, this is not to say that
there will be absolutely no control upon oppressive and overreach-
ing lenders. It is most likely that courts will apply unconscion-
ability concepts to set aside or scale down interest payments in the
unusual case in which the lender has unjustifiably overcharged.
However, courts should, and no doubt will, move very cautiously
because of a realization that rates which on first glance appear
to be excessive may, on closer examination, appear to have
been entirely justified on the facts. Both those who want courts to
apply the unconscionabiity concept in this area and those who fear
that inexpert courts will set aside bona fide lending transactions can
take comfort from the recent Elkin Dell litigation.22 In those cases,
the referee in bankruptcy held unconscionable and unenforceable
two financing arrangements under which an accounts receivable
financer received interest of 15.8 percent per year in one case and 18
percent in the other, and which contained other provisions which
were rather lopsided in favor of the lender. Both borrowers were
corporations not subject to the applicable State usury laws. On
appeal, the district judge reversed and remanded the cases for a full
hearing on the question of unconscionability. In the course of the
opinion the court said:
We entertain grave doubts about the wisdom of declining to enforce
contracts entered into under these circumstances. It would be un-
sound to encourage bankruptcy trustees or general creditors to
attempt to escape lawful factoring debts by impassioned appeals
to equity - unsound because it would be inconsistent with the
scheme of the Bankruptcy Act and because it would tend to dry
up the credit of businesses who need it most. There are impor-
tant considerations of policy in favor of promoting the availability
of funds for businesses in distress, even at unusually high rates of
interest. The risks of lending are sometimes great, and the in-
ducements may have to be commensurate. 2 3
202 In re Elkin Dell Mfg. Co., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1021 (Referee ED. Pa. 1965), vacated
& remanded, 253 F. Supp. 864 (ED. Pa. 1966); In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 U.C.C.
Rep. 1016 (Referee E.D. Pa. 1965), vacated & remanded, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa.
1966); see Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of Unenforce-
ability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. REv. 193 (1967).
203 253 F. Supp. at 871. The court also said: 'To hold these contracts unenforce-
able on their face would probably be to impose a judicially invented but economically
dysfunctional morality upon knowledgeable contracting parties. It might jeopardize
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In spite of its doubts, the court remanded the case for a full hear-
ing on unconscionability, and, in its opinion, went on to point out
that the factors which should be considered in determining whether
a loan is unconscionable are (1) the extent to which agreements of
the kind in question are customary; (2) the extent to which the
lender's contracts vary with and reflect anticipated risks; (3) the
availability of other funds to the borrowers; (4) whether such con-
tracts facilitated commerce by making more funds available or
whether they impeded commerce by precluding access to other
sources of funds; and (5) the effects of holding the agreements
unconscionable on future financing of similar businesses in need.
The court's tests for unconscionability are also strong arguments
against legislative price fixing in the business area. Courts can take
such factors into consideration in the particular case; the legislature
cannot tailor its rules finely enough to do so.
(6) Uniformity. -In addition to its effect in curing some of
the ills of the present interest rate regulation system in the United
States, the Consumer Code would also have even greater effect
than did the Uniform Commercial Code in producing uniformity
among the various States. At a time when probably most business
volume is done -by organizations which operate in more than one
State and when millions of consumers move from State to State
every year, there will be substantial advantages, both to business
and consumers, from a uniform law. 26 4
B. Conclusion
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code would replace the mul-
titudinous State laws in the consumer credit area with a single,
unified treatment, providing protection for consumer, agricultural,
and small business borrowers, and would leave other business
transactions free of statutory rate regulation. The Consumer Code
scheme of setting a maximum rate for conscionable transactions in
certain areas and leaving actual rates to free market determination is,
it is submitted, a very substantial improvement over the present mud-
the availability of receivables financing for those for whom factoring is the only prac-
ticable way of securing capital ....
264 A substantial amount of the law review writing has been directed toward the
problems of counseling multistate operations on the interest laws of the various States.
See, e.g., Hershman, Usury and the Tight Money Market, 22 Bus. LAw. 333, 340
(1967). See also Address by Bonin, Life Insurance Company Investments: What Price
Interest, to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel (1960) (copy on file in University
of Illinois, College of Law library).
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dled and irrational system. The Consumer Code can cure the usury
headache - and reduce to simplicity and comprehension the present
incomprehensible collection of State laws.
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APPENDIX B
Charts showing estimated percentage of total private debt subject to general usury
laws in 15 States. (Taken from unpublished study by Professor Henry J. Bailey, 3d, of
Willamette University of College of Law, entitled, Analysis of Existing Debt in the
United States and State by State on Basis of Existing Law Affecting Interest Rates and
Finance Charges (1966). Professor Bailey comments on the methods used to compile
his figures and charts as follows:
To develop these figures, it was found that as to certain classes of debt figures
were available for some of the fifteen states. These figures were used where
they were available if the source seemed reasonably reliable. In those cases
where no debt figures were available, an approximation of the amount of debt
in the several classes was obtained by applying percentages against ... national
figures....
It is recognized that the methods used to obtain the figures ... for each
state are not ideal and the resulting figures ... can only be estimated approxi-
mations.
While it is recognized that the methods used in developing figures are not
ideal, it is believed they are reasonable under the circumstances, first, because
the basic objective of this paper is to develop estimated approximations of the
volume of debt in different classes ... and, secondly, because it is believed the
methods used and the figures obtained are probably as satisfactory and accurate
as may be obtained in view of the limited figures available. Id. at 1-2.
Even assuming that the Bailey figures are occasionally subject to substantial percent-
ages of error, they are undoubtedly sufficiently accurate to make it clear that a majority
of private debt in the States studied is not subject to usury statues.
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COLORADO - Pie chart for all types of Colorado credit subject
or not subject to usury law.
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IOWA - Pie chart for all types of Iowa credit subject or not
subject to usury law.
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NEW MEXICO - Pie chart for all types of New Mexico credit
subject or not subject to usury law.
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